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Working Memory can be conceived as a mental workspace holding and 
manipulating a limited amount of recently acquired information for a limited 
time. Some theories assume that it is tightly coupled with Consciousness (e.g., 
Baars & Franklin, 2003), commonly defined in experimental studies as the 
ability to report the content of perception or of memory. Other theories posit 
that working memory includes cognitive processes of which participants are not 
conscious (e.g., Soto et al., 2011; Logie, 2016), and can be activated without 
conscious intention (Hassin et al., 2009).  
Here, I describe experimental work designed to investigate the possible implicit 
activation of working memory without awareness. Importantly, participants 
were not only unaware of the stimuli that might be held in working memory, 
but also unaware that such stimuli were being presented at all. They were asked 
to guess which one of four cards presented on the screen was the winning one; 
one card was subliminally primed before a retention interval (which could vary 
between 500, 1000, 2000 and 5000 ms). The winner, on each trial, was chosen 
from amongst four blue cards, one of which had been primed, without 
awareness, by a card of a different colour (red or green) using Continuous Flash 
Suppression or Backward Masking.  
Bayesian and classical analyses from nine experiments mostly support the null 
hypothesis, thus indicating that working memory was not engaged in 
performing this task. Two conceptual replications and four exact replications of 
the original study by Soto et al. (2011), also failed in reproducing the original 
results. In conclusion, this collection of fifteen experiments encompassing 
different manipulations shows the absence of non-conscious WM retention, 






La memoria di lavoro (Working Memory) è un sistema di controllo deputato al 
mantenimento, alla manipolazione ed all’elaborazione delle informazioni utili al 
conseguimento di uno scopo immediato. I modelli tradizionali considerano i 
processi e i contenuti della WM strettamente legati alla elaborazione cosciente. 
Tuttavia, recenti studi mettono in discussione tale assunto, dimostrando che si 
possono ritenere in memoria di lavoro stimoli di cui non si è consapevoli (Soto 
et al., 2011) e che la WM può essere attivata in modo implicito (Hassin et al., 
2009). Questa tesi indaga la possibilità che la WM possa elaborare 
l’informazione in maniera indipendente dalla consapevolezza, ovvero possa 
essere attivata implicitamente da uno stimolo percepito al di sotto della soglia di 
consapevolezza.  
Il paradigma ideato prevede di chiedere ai soggetti di scegliere quale fosse la 
carta vincente tra quattro carte da gioco. Prima della scelta, in un intervallo di 
tempo di variabile tra 500, 1000, 2000 e 5000 ms, la carta vincente viene 
presentata in maniera subliminale, tramite Continuous Flash Suppression o 
Backward Masking.  
I risultati di nove esperimenti basati su diversi stimoli e tecniche di 
mascheramento, e con classiche analisi della varianza e analisi Bayesiane, non 
sostengono questa ipotesi. Inoltre, ulteriori sei esperimenti volti a replicare (2 
repliche concettuali e 4 repliche esatte) studi presenti in letteratura non 
dimostrano l’esistenza di WM senza consapevolezza.  
Il presente lavoro si inserisce nel dibattito sulla generalizzabilità dei risultati 
degli studi sulla percezione inconsapevole. L’assenza di effetti affidabili e la 
mancanza di replicazione di studi dimostranti WM implicita, non ne sostengono 






The idea that we can perform actions of which we are not aware or that our 
behaviour can be influenced by something of which we are not aware has a long 
history as a source of fascination for the general public. In the last century, 
thanks to technological advancement, many scientists started exploring this 
possibility scientifically: does non-conscious cognition exist? According to some 
of them not only it exists, but it is also deeper than expected. They observed that 
it is even possible to extract the meaning of sentences or doing arithmetic 
without being aware of it. These studies, however, are very controversial, as the 
methodology they use has yet to be refined and their results are seldom 
replicated. The present work describes fifteen experiments failing to replicate 
results that have been previously reported in literature, contributing to the 
debate concerning the reliability of conclusions from non-conscious cognition 
studies.  
The experiments focus on non-conscious Working Memory. We use WM when 
we keep in mind information for a brief period of time in order to achieve a goal, 
like remembering a temporary security code or the shopping list. Some authors 
define it as the place where thinking takes place, and it is commonly associated 
with conscious experience which means that we can report its content and the 
operation we perform on it. Recent studies, nonetheless, suggest that processing 
of subliminal stimuli can be carried out within WM. Also, other studies 
suggested that WM can be engaged without explicit instructions. 
If WM can be disentangled entirely from consciousness- as it can retain stimuli 
which do not belong to conscious awareness and can also be activated without 
conscious intention by visible stimuli - then it should get non-consciously 
activated by subliminal stimuli to be retained in order to perform a task. 
With the current work I addressed this possibility, testing whether, to perform 
an ambiguous task, people can engage WM to retain a subliminal prime without 
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being instructed to do so and without awareness both of the prime and of WM 
activation. Participants were engaged in a guessing game in which they had to 
guess which of four playing cards was the winning card. Actually, the location of 
the winning card was subliminally presented before every selection.  
A series of nine experiments, encompassing different masking methods and 
manipulations, did not find any effect of the subliminal prime on participants’ 
choices. Six attempts to replicate experiments already published also did not 
confirm the original results. 
This work does not confirm the possibility that WM can be non-conscious, and 
contributes to the debate about non-conscious cognition studies, pointing out 
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that we can process information of which we are not aware and that 
some cognitive processes can take place without us being aware of them has 
always fascinated researchers and the general public. After behaviourism’s 
denial of the topic as an object of scientific investigation (Dienes & Seth, 2010) 
the 21st century has been characterised by a multidisciplinary effort in trying to 
explain the nature and the neural basis of conscious experience, its function and 
can be done without awareness. Still, even though consciousness is not 
considered a scientific taboo any longer, it remains a very controversial subject 
of investigation. 
The concept of awareness (or consciousness) is hard to define. Depending on 
the context, the concept of consciousness can assume diverse meanings. Here, as 
in most of the experimental literature I will describe, consciousness is defined 
as the ability to report experiencing the content of perception, whereas a 
conscious process can be defined as a process claimed by people to be conscious 
and can be accurately reported and acted upon (McGovern & Baars, 2007). 
This definition seems to simplify the operationalization of the subject, by 
pointing to subjective reports as an indicator of whether something was 
consciously experienced or not. In reality, however, researchers struggle to find 
a convincing method of assessment and analysis: subjective reports, in fact, 
have been shown to be prone to biases as people usually underestimate their 
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ability to discriminate (Eriksen, 1960; Bjorkman, Juslin, & Winman, 1993). In 
the last years, advancements in technology and the improvements of 
measurement methods raised expectations regarding the possibility of 
overcoming this problem and exploring non-conscious cognition in an 
“objective” way, leading to the development of empirical based and falsifiable 
theories of consciousness (Block et al., 2014). In fact, there has been an 
increasing number of studies on non-conscious cognition, and the appearance of 
specific peer-reviewed journals dedicated to consciousness science.   
First, non-conscious cognition studies were related to short-lived, automatic 
low-level function (e.g. Koch & Crick, 2001), such as priming. The first studies 
showing a facilitation effect of unseen priming words on the processing of 
following target words date back to 1983 (Marcel, 1983). These studies 
encountered strong scepticism and criticisms (Holender, 1986), especially on 
the methodological ground, but recently this possibility has been newly 
investigated.  
 It has been demonstrated, for example, that stimuli of which participants are 
not aware can bias performance. In a study by Dehaene et al. (1998) 
participants were asked to rate whether a number was higher or lower than 5. 
Before the target number they were subliminally primed with a number that 
could have been either congruent or incongruent with the target number. 
Strikingly, participants were faster when they were primed with a number 
congruent with the target (a prime number lower than 5 with a target number 
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lower than 5), and slower when primed with an incongruent number (a prime 
number lower than 5 with a target number higher than 5). 
Since then, researchers have been testing the depth of unconscious processing, 
and have gone far beyond the processing of simple and briefly presented 
stimuli. Several studies have investigated the possibility that high-level 
processes can take place outside of conscious experience, suggesting that it is 
possible to process the meaning of subliminal words and sentences and do 
arithmetic unconsciously (Sklar et al., 2012), taking complex decisions 
(Dijksterhuis, 2008) and keeping subliminal stimuli in memory for up to 15 
seconds (Bergström & Eriksson, 2014). 
This notwithstanding, the scientific community is divided, and there is debate 
between those who proclaim the depth of non-conscious cognition and those 
who recommend caution. In fact, new measurement methods have given rise to 
new concerns and critiques, and replicability rates and statistical power of non-
conscious cognition studies are still very low (Marcus Rothkirch & Hesselmann, 
2017; Shanks, 2016; Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2015). As noted by 
Shanks (2016, page 2) “the past half-century of research on unconscious 
cognition [...] has been characterised by repeated cycles in which new ways of 
demonstrating unconscious processes have been challenged by later 
investigations.”  
In the following sections, I will describe some of the most influential studies on 
high-level non-conscious cognition, summarised by the Yes It Can principle 
(Hassin, 2013), according to which every function can be carried out non-
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consciously, and their critiques. Then I will focus on one particular high-level 
function, Working Memory, and the possibility that this high-level function, 
usually considered to be strongly coupled with awareness can be active 
unconsciously.  
1.1  The exploration of high-level unconscious processing 
High-level cognitive processes can be defined as functions requiring complex 
computations and cognitive control (Hassin, 2013), like problem-solving, 
planning, abstract thinking and so on. They have usually been associated with 
consciousness, but some researchers have recently started challenging this 
view, dominated by a “conscious-centric” bias (Bargh & Morsella, 2008). This 
new light on non-conscious processing is based on the findings that some 
complex elaboration seems to take place also outside of conscious awareness. 
In a series of studies, Sklar et al. (2012) demonstrated that participants were 
able to process the meaning of subliminal sentences and could solve arithmetic 
operations unconsciously. They presented participants with subliminal 
sentences that could be either semantically coherent or incoherent (e.g. I ironed 
clothes vs I ironed the coffee, respectively). Sentences were rendered subliminal 
by presenting them to one eye while the other eye was presented with a 
dynamic and colourful pattern, a technique based on binocular rivalry and 
known as Continuous Flash Suppression (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). I describe 
this method more extensively in the next chapters). Participants were asked to 
indicate whether the sentence appeared above or below the fixation cross. Sklar 
16 
 
et al.’s (2012) found that participants’ responses were faster in the incongruent 
condition, indicating that participants were sensitive to the semantic 
incongruence despite the fact that it was unconscious. The same effect was 
found with affective sentences, where negative sentences broke the suppression 
faster than positive ones. A series of control experiments, where sentences were 
presented supraliminally, ruled out the possibility that such effects were due to 
a faster decision rather than a faster breakthrough.  
Moreover, in a further series of experiments, Sklar et al. (2012) found that 
participants’ reaction times were also facilitated when asked to name a number 
matching the result of a subliminally primed mathematical three single-digit 
subtraction. This demonstrated that abstract operations like reading and doing 
arithmetic can be carried out unconsciously (but see the next section for a 
description of failed replications). 
This is one of the bases of the “Yes It Can” principle (Hassin, 2013), according to 
which every function that can be carried out consciously can also be performed 
unconsciously. More support comes from studies demonstrating that several 
other high-level functions- like conflict management, decision making and goal 
pursuit-  usually associated with consciousness, can be carried out 
unconsciously or be influenced by subliminal stimuli  (Bargh, 1990; Bijleveld, 
Custers, & Aarts, 2011; Ap Dijksterhuis, 2006; for a review see Hassin, 2013) 
Priming participants with subliminally presented flags, for instance, seems to 
influence political attitude and voting intentions (Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, 
& Gross, 2007). Besides, according to some social psychology experiments, 
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consciousness can even be counterintuitively disadvantageous when making 
complex decisions: Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren (2006) found that 
participants chose the best options among the ones given when in the time 
between the options presentation and the choice they were engaged in a 
distracting task rather than evaluating the options. According to the authors, 
preventing conscious evaluation of the choices allows ‘unconscious thought’ to 
deliberate free from conscious constraints (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). On the 
basis of several experiments yielding this conclusion, Dijksterhuis (2008) 
proposed the Unconscious Thought Theory, according to which better decisions 
on complex problems are taken following a period of distraction rather than of 
conscious deliberation. This claim is based on the supposition that unconscious, 
differently from conscious thought, would have no capacity restraints, so that it 
can take into account broader information (Dijksterhuis, 2008). 
 The enthusiasm about this idea got to the point of suggesting physicians rely on 
their unconscious deliberation when taking complex decisions (e.g. Manigault, 
Handley, & Whillock, 2015) which basically means not thinking about the best 
solution to an issue. 
It is important to note that there is still some difference between conscious and 
unconscious functions according to the YIC principle: the two processes may 
have different outcomes and require different conditions to emerge. Hassin 
(2013) compares non-conscious abilities to the sprint runners: they can run 
100ms in less than 10s, but they do it only when required. Similarly, according 
to the YIC principle, every function can be potentially carried out unconsciously 
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but it does not necessarily happen all the time. The possibility of non-conscious 
processing increases with practice, motivation and ability in performing such 
operations.  
So, according to the YIC principle, if a function is tested in a way that allows it to 
occur unconsciously, metaphorically putting a sprint runner in a match, then 
every function that is known to work consciously will also be found to work 
outside of conscious awareness.  
1.1.1  Critiques and controversies related to unconscious processing 
studies 
As mentioned above, studies on consciousness, and especially on non-conscious 
processes, are still very controversial. Doubts have been raised against Hassin's 
YIC principle. Critiques mainly concern two aspects: experimental methodology 
and lack of replication.  
With regard to experimental methodology, the primary problem lies in finding a 
reliable way to assess awareness, or better, its absence. As explained above, 
consciousness is by definition a subjective state, thus assessing it in an objective 
way is a big experimental challenge. A common practice consists of collecting 
subjective and objective measures of awareness. Subjective measures of 
awareness rely on merely asking participants to rate how well they saw the 
stimulus, usually on a specific 4 points Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy & 
Overgaard, 2004), or asking how confident they are about their response 
(Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014). Usually, only trials in 
which participants report being unaware of the stimulus are analysed. These 
19 
 
methods are susceptible to response bias, i.e. the inclination to prefer one 
response over others (McMillan & Creelman, 1990; Eriksen, 1960). Responses, 
in fact, are not only influenced by sensitivity, i.e. the ability to distinguish signal 
from noise, but also by participants’ criterion for deciding one option over the 
others when the sensory information is not strong enough to determine a clear 
choice (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). When asked to state if a stimulus was seen 
or not, participants tend to use a conservative criterion, which means they 
would claim no awareness even if they partially saw the stimulus (Bjorkman, 
Juslin, & Winman, 1993). This is why subjective reports are usually 
accompanied by the calculation of d’ prime (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001), 
a bias-free index of participants’ sensitivity, derived from signal detection 
theory (Green & Swets, 1966). 
On the other hand, objective measures consist of testing participants on their 
ability to detect a particular feature of the stimuli in an awareness test or 
control experiment. Participants scoring significantly above chance on this 
awareness test are excluded from data analysis. 
Objective measures have two problems: in first place they may be over-
conservative (e.g. Hesselmann, 2013; Sterzer et al., 2014), leading to the 
exclusion of observations which are due to genuine subliminal priming rather 
than to conscious experience of the stimulus. However, the most worrying issue 
concerning these measurement methods, recently pointed out by Shanks 
(2016), is regression to the mean. This refers to the mathematical necessity that 
when cases are measured on two variables and have an extreme score on one of 
the variables, they will have a high probability to obtain a score closer to the 
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mean on the other variable (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). Thus, selecting 
only observations that indicate no awareness (extremely low scores on the 
awareness measure) is unlikely to also give extremely low scores in the other 
task just for a statistical reason. Concerns about post-hoc data selection have 
been nicely illustrated by Schmidt (2015) with an effective metaphor: the 
selection of some data based on a specific criterion is like carrying out a drug 
study by selecting only patients who did not die from it. 
Both subjective and objective methods also have another problem: they are 
based on the failure to reject the null hypothesis. When analysing the d’ scores, 
for example, a d’ of zero means that participants are not able to distinguish 
signal from noise, i.e. they are likely to be unaware of the signal. So, the 
hypothesis tested is whether the mean d’ is significantly different from 0, and 
failing to reject the null hypothesis is taken as acceptance of the null hypothesis, 
a conclusion which is theoretically incorrect (e.g., Vadillo et al., 2015, Persuh, 
2018) and should not be drawn based on the classical statistic (null hypothesis 
test). Bayesian analyses, on the other hand, would lead to more convincing 
deductions by actually testing the likelihood of the null hypothesis to be true 
compared to the alternative (Vadillo et al., 2015; Sterzer et al., 2014;  Dienes, 
2014). Still, so far few studies in this field have reported Bayesian analyses 
(Vadillo et al., 2015).  
 The same problem arises when claiming that performance in a control task is 




The second critique of the YIC principle (Hassin, 2013) is the lack of 
replications, and especially independent replications (Shanks, 2016). As noted 
by Hesselmann & Moors (2015) in their “definitely maybe” reply to Hassin, not 
only is the YIC principle based on a partial literature review but, since its 
publication, many replication attempts of high-level unconscious processing 
experiments have failed to obtain the original results.  
Rabagliati, Robertson, & Carmel (2018), for example, carried out a series of 
experiments trying to replicate the unconscious reading effect found by Sklar et 
al. (2012) and described above. Strikingly, they could not find any evidence of 
unconscious reading or semantic comprehension, not even related to a single 
word. By running a series of simulations, Rabagliati et al. demonstrated that this 
discrepancy may be due to the fact that the results of Sklar et al. (2012) could be 
an artefact due to common outliers exclusions practices; such practices increase 
the probability of entirely spurious false positives (Rabagliati et al., 2018).  
Similarly, by re-analysing data of the unconscious arithmetic experiment (Sklar 
et al. 2012), Shanks (2016) demonstrated that participants with high awareness 
score were actually showing a smaller priming effect than the participants with 
low awareness score, thus data apparently reflect a regression to the mean 
rather than unconscious processing. A further re-analysis of the same data 
(Moors & Hesselmann, 2018) reproduced the effect only partially, showing that 
it is much weaker than expected.  From their set of results, it appears clear that 
more evidence is required for claiming the existence of unconscious arithmetic 
(Moors & Hesselmann, 2018), finding that is already having a significant impact 
on theories of unconscious processing.  
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The need for further evidence of unconscious arithmetic also emerges from the 
fact that the only successful replication attempt to date (Karpinski, Yale, & 
Briggs, 2016) was retracted following the discovery of a calculation error which, 
once corrected, changed the results showing very weak evidence for 
unconscious arithmetic (Karpinski, Yale, Briggs, Prislin, & Vivian, 2017). 
Issues with replicability also come from social psychology. One famous case is a 
study by Bargh, Chen, & Burrows (1996) demonstrating that priming 
participants with ageing-related words made them walk slower when leaving 
the laboratory. When substituting the experimenters ‘stopwatch with 
automated timing methods to measure the time it took participants to exit the 
lab, this effect  disappeared in a failed independent replication (Doyen, Klein, 
Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012).  
Many critiques, objections and failed replications had also defied the 
unconscious thought theory (Dijksterhuis, 2008). A meta-analysis carried out on 
Dijksterhuis experiments, along with a large scale replication attempt, led 
Nieuwenstein et al. (2015)  to conclude that unconscious advantage effects 
found by Dijksterhuis were due to underpowered experiments and that there is 
no reliable support for such a theory. This is particularly worrying considering 
that physicians have been advised to act according to their gut instinct, without 
additional thought (see above, Manigault et al., 2015)! Vadillo, Kostopoulou, & 
Shanks (2015), also published a meta-analysis of the unconscious thought effect 
in clinical decisions, supported by Bayesian analyses. They could not find any 
evidence of such an effect and recommend that physicians should not base their 
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decisions on the idea of unconscious thought, at least until more supporting 
evidence is gathered. 
It has to be noted that such critiques do not rule out the possibility of non-
conscious processing, but taking them into account is mandatory in planning 
studies on this topic and interpreting their results. 
1.2   Working Memory and Consciousness 
Working Memory is one of the high-level functions usually associated with 
consciousness to the point of even being identified with it by some theories (e.g. 
Baars & Franklin, 2003). 
According to various theories, Working Memory is a volatile information store 
and control system concerning maintenance and online elaboration of 
information to pursue current behavioural goals (e.g. Baddeley, 2012; Logie & 
Cowan, 2015). It can be conceived as a mental workspace holding and 
manipulating a limited amount of recently acquired bits of information for a 
limited time. Baars and Franklin (2003) describe it as the workspace where 
thinking and cognition take place.  
Although each theory of WM suggests a slightly different definition of the 
concept (Cowan, 2016), the prevailing idea is that WM and consciousness are 
coupled in a close relationship, and sometimes they even overlap (e.g. Baars & 
Franklin, 2003; Kintsch, Healy, Hegarty, Pennington, & Salthouse, 1999). 
Nevertheless, this idea has been mostly assumed implicitly (Velichkovsky, 
2017), hence there is little direct evidence for it (Logie, 2009), while a growing 
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number of experiments is testing the possibility that WM, or at least some of its 
aspects (Logie & Cowan, 2015; Pylyshyn, 1973) can operate outside of 
consciousness. (Bona & Silvanto, 2014; Hassin, 2013; Soto & Silvanto, 2016; 
Trübutschek, Marti, Ojeda, & King, 2017) 
Therefore, at the moment the nature of such a relationship between WM and 
awareness is still not clearly understood (Eriksson, Vogel, Lansner, Bergstrom, 
& Nyberg, 2015). The main perspectives on the issue have been described by 
Jacobs & Silvanto (2015, see figure 1.1): the classical viewpoint suggests that 
WM functions are necessarily conscious; the second view allows the possibility 
that there may be WM contents of which we are not aware; and the third 
viewpoint regards WM and consciousness as two entirely distinct mechanisms, 
suggesting that memory trace not directly accessible to consciousness and 
introspection.  
Below, I review studies demonstrating that the content of WM can be 
constituted of stimuli of which we are not aware, and that WM can be engaged 




Figure 1.1 Different views of the relationship between WM and consciousness (Jacobs & 
Silvanto, 2016). The blue circle represents WM and the red circle illustrates the current 
conscious representation. A) the classical view, according to which all WM functions are 
conscious. B) Only a subset of the WM is experienced consciously and other operations can take 
place outside of it. C) WM content is completely separate from conscious experience. 
 
1.2.1 Evidence for WM processing of subliminal stimuli 
A classical assumption about WM is that its content is necessarily conscious or 
easily accessible by consciousness (e.g. Baars & Franklin, 2003). Nevertheless, 
an increasing number of studies seems to demonstrate that stimuli of which a 
person is not aware can be retained in WM. One of the first demonstrations 
supporting this account was the observation of a patient claiming an inability to 
experience any kind of visual mental experience who nonetheless could engage 
in visual working memory processes: Botez, Olivier, Vézina, Botez, & Kaufman 
(1985) reported a case of a patient with a congenital visual imagery deficit. He 
was unable to imaging people, places and objects, but nevertheless could 
identify unfamiliar patterns seen a few moments earlier, thus demonstrating 
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that visual and spatial working memory may be dissociated from perceptual 
awareness of visual information (Logie, 2009).  
More recently, Soto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto (2011) using backward masking 
showed that WM can operate on non-conscious stimuli on healthy participants. 
In this study participants were briefly presented with a Gabor patch, a 
sinusoidal grating seen through a Gaussian window, followed by a mask. 
Participants were instructed to attend to the Gabor even if they could not 
consciously perceive it, in order to perform an eventual discrimination task.  
After a delay period during which a subjective rating of cue visibility was 
required, to rule out the possibility that the cue was consciously perceived, 
participants were presented with a visible Gabor target and asked to judge 
whether the target was oriented clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to the 
cue. Results showed above chance performance, thus suggesting that the cue 
had been processed and maintained in memory though it was not consciously 
perceived. Notably, cue-target orientation discrimination was still significantly 
above chance even if visible distracter Gabors were presented during the 
retention interval.  
The same authors confirmed a similar pattern of results in a subsequent study 
(Dutta, Shah, Silvanto, & Soto, 2014), accompanied by fMRI scans and tDCS 
stimulation of prefrontal areas. They demonstrated that prefrontal cortex, 
usually associated with high-level function and memory (Curtis & D’Esposito, 
2003), was engaged during the maintenance of unseen stimuli.  
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Along the same lines, Bergström & Eriksson (2015) showed that it is possible to 
retain subliminally presented faces in memory for 15 seconds, in order to 
perform a delayed match to sample task. In this kind of task, participants are 
asked to state whether a target stimulus is the same as the prime stimulus or 
not. The priming stimulus in Bergstrom and Erikkson (2015) was rendered 
subliminal by CFS, and participants were performing above chance despite the 
fact that they claimed they were unaware of the to-be-remembered stimulus.  
The authors got similar above-chance performance when asking to discriminate 
the similarity of the subliminal prime and the targets on both location and 
identity. In this second experiment, stimuli consisted of pictures of tools and the 
delay was shorter (consisting of 5s). These results confirmed those of 
Bergstrom and Erikkson’s previous paper (Bergström & Eriksson, 2014) using 
attentional blink to render priming stimuli invisible and scanning participants 
with fMRI during the task. Attentional blink refers to the phenomenon whereby 
participants fail to detect a target if it is presented in rapid succession with 
another one (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). Undetected stimuli still 
affected participants’ performance after 15 seconds, accompanied by a BOLD 
signal change in the lateral prefrontal cortex (Bergstrom and Erikkson, 2014), 
thus confirming results by Dutta et al. (2014), who also observed prefrontal 
activation during the maintenance of unseen stimuli.  
The same activation related to memory recognition of subliminal stimuli has 




Further evidence of long retention of subliminal stimuli is reported by 
Trübutschek et al. (2017), who found that participants can correctly locate an 
invisible target appearing in 1 out of 20 possible locations even after a 4s delay 
and despite the presence of distractors and memory load, thus confirming the 
results of Soto et al. (2011). 
1.2.1.1  Critiques and open questions 
Despite the evidence for non-conscious WM reviewed in the previous section, 
there are some interesting critiques to consider about the interpretation of the 
non-conscious WM studies. Stein, Kaiser, & Hesselmann (2016), for instance, 
point out that studies on WM maintenance of subliminal stimuli do not 
necessarily demonstrate the existence of unconscious WM. According to the 
conscious maintenance hypothesis (Stein et al., 2016), the above chance 
performance could be due to the conscious maintenance in WM of a guess 
performed following non-conscious priming. So, even if the choice is due to 
subliminal priming, it could be consciously retained into conscious WM until the 
response.  
Trübutschek et al. (2017) tried to address this issue by comparing neural 
signals on seen and unseen trials through magnetoencephalography. Along with 
the behavioural results described above, they found desynchronization in brain 
activity in the frontal areas only in the ‘seen’ trials, while in the unseen trials, no 
matter whether they were correct or not, brain activity was similar to target-
absent trials (control condition). According to the authors, this rules out the 
possibility that behavioural results were due to miscategorisation of unseen 
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trials (i.e., some trials were labelled as “not seen” by mistake and would have 
influenced the performance). They conclude that their findings rule out 
conscious maintenance, as neural signatures in the unseen trials were not 
comparable to those of conscious trials, so it unlikely that any conscious process 
was taking place. However, the authors acknowledge that more evidence is 
required to draw definitive conclusions, especially considering that the sample 
size and the number of unseen trials in their study are relatively small to detect 
subtle effects.  
Another weakness of non-conscious WM studies to date concerns the way in 
which awareness is assessed, as the measures used appear to be prone to bias. 
Stein et al. (2016), for instance, demonstrated that the way Soto et al. (2011) 
and Dutta et al. (2014) calculated the perceptual sensitivity index of the 
subliminal cue is susceptible to subjective bias, so it is not comparable with a 
classical d’ formula, a bias-free index based on signal detection theory.  
Furthermore, these studies are subject to the same critiques generally raised 
with regard to unconscious processing studies (e.g., Vadillo et al., 2015; Shanks, 
2016) as described in the section 1.1.1, about the procedures used to assess 
awareness, mostly based on subjective reports, acceptance of the null 
hypothesis and post-hoc data selection.  
1.2.2  Evidence for implicit WM activation 
Another aspect of the relationship between WM and awareness that has been 
challenged is implicit WM activation. Hassin, Bargh, Engell, & Mcculloch (2009) 
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demonstrated that WM operations, linked to recall of long-term memory 
representations, can be engaged unintentionally.  
In this study, observers were asked to judge as quickly as possible whether a 
dot appearing on the screen was filled or empty. Each dot’s position in a 
sequence of such presentations could follow a familiar pattern (for example 
zigzag), be random, or follow a broken pattern. Participants’ behavioural 
performance was, crucially, facilitated when the sequence followed a familiar 
pattern. Moreover, participants reported being unaware of having extracted the 
sequence information. As constructing the pattern requires the maintenance of 
the previous dots’ positions and the updating of visual information, the authors 
concluded that an implicit activation of WM was involved. 
Soto & Silvanto (2014) suggest a possible autonomous activation of those WM 
functions hardwired by experience, which can occur in the case of semantic 
retrieval. This idea is supported by evidence from a large number of studies that 
WM performance within an individual’s areas of expertise can be boosted by 
knowledge and learned strategies belonging to long-term memory (De Groot, 
1965; Ericcson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980; Ericsson & Polson, 1988; for a review see 
Logie, 2016). 
Silvanto & Soto (2012), moreover, demonstrated that subliminal distractors can 
impact WM accuracy even if participants are not instructed to attend to them. 
They confirmed this results in a subsequent study (Bona, Cattaneo, Vecchi, Soto, 
& Silvanto, 2013), where the impact of subliminal distractors was found to affect 
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not only objective performance but also the subjective experience of memory-
representation vividness. 
These findings suggest the existence of implicit WM activation and maintenance 
of visual details (Velichkovsky, 2017). 
1.2.2.1  Critiques and open questions 
The notion of implicit WM is particularly problematic: not only is there very 
little supporting evidence, but the interpretation of relevant findings is also 
controversial due to the difficulty of disentangling this notion from the more 
general one of automated processing (Velichkovsky, 2017). 
Automated processes, by definition, take place without the need for conscious 
control (Norman & Shallice, 1986), and it is not clear whether operations of data 
storage within such processes actually require a WM activation; the effect 
attributed to an implicit WM activation might be due to other automatic 
mechanisms (Velichkovsky, 2017). For example, an alternative interpretation of 
results by Hassin et al. (2009), might be that exposure to familiar patterns 
activated a perceptual-motor scheme (Norman and Shallice, 1986), leading to 
rapid automated responses not necessarily linked to WM (Velichkovsky, 2017).  
Another interesting example comes from Della Sala, van der Meulen, 
Bestelmeyer, & Logie (2010), who demonstrated that implicit processing of 
semantic material from long-term memory can take place independently from 
WM activation. They asked brain-damaged British patients with left-sided 
unilateral spatial neglect to listen to and read lists of four proverbs. The 
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proverbs could be familiar (British) or unfamiliar (foreign). While reading and 
listening, participants were shown with a picture depicting one of the proverbs. 
Patients’ recognition of the proverb matching the picture was above chance, 
even if the key objects of the proverbs were depicted on the left neglected side 
of their visual field. Crucially, this was true only for familiar, but not unfamiliar 
proverbs. The same results were obtained with healthy participants, using 
subliminal presentation of one half of each picture. As facilitation from the 
subliminal features of the pictures was only obtained for familiar proverbs, the 
authors interpreted the results as indicating direct activation of semantic 
memory from perception, without intermediate stages of processing in working 
memory.  
Thus, it could be the case that the results of Hassin et al. (2009) might have been 
due to similar long-term memory retrieval rather than WM activation, or that 
the results by Della Sala et al. (2010)  were due to implicit WM activation 
limited to material stored in the semantic system. Such material would be easier 
to process subliminally than new semantic material, whose acquisition can be 
beyond the abilities of subliminal processing. 
It is clear that further exploration of the issue is needed. For example, finding 
evidence of implicit WM activation driven by stimuli not belonging to LTM or 




1.3  The Research Question 
The brief review above makes it clear that there is the need for further 
investigation on the relationship between WM and consciousness. In particular, 
if WM can retain subliminal stimuli (e.g., Soto et al., 2011) and can be implicitly 
activated (Hassin et al., 2009), then finding evidence of implicit WM activation 
by subliminal stimuli would support the idea that WM can be completely 
dissociated from consciousness.  
The experimental procedure proposed here allows for the assessment of the 
possibility of implicit WM activation by objects that were perceived recently and 
non-consciously. Something to take into account is that the conditions for 
implicit WM activation are not clear. In fact, it also has to be clarified whether 
implicit activation of WM can take place with objects that are not represented in 
long-term memory, similarly to the study mentioned above by Della Sala et al. 
(2010). It is also not clear whether WM operations on non-conscious items can 
be activated without explicit intention and motivation (Soto and Silvanto, 2014), 
especially when dealing with newly acquired stimuli. In their review on WM 
without consciousness, Soto and Silvanto (2014) suggest that some motivation 
is required to hold subliminal stimuli in WM, and that implicit WM activation 
can be triggered by functions that are hardwired by experience.  
This claim, though, not only bolsters the idea that ‘implicit WM’ effects might 
actually be due to more general automatic processing (Velichkovsky, 2017 see 
section 1.2.2.1 ), but also seems to contradict their findings (Silvanto and Soto, 
2012) of subliminal distractors influencing WM performance even when 
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participants are not instructed to attend to them. This contradiction can be 
accounted for by the contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis (Folk, 
Remington, & Wright, 1994) according to which under conditions of spatial 
uncertainty, stimuli with features critical to the performance trigger involuntary 
attentional capture (Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014). 
Therefore, if WM can be implicitly activated, then a relevant stimulus in a 
condition of uncertainty, where no instructions are given about the best choice) 
should be able to trigger such activation even if it is not represented in LTM. 
Thus, implicit WM activation may be unrelated to motor activation 
(Velichkovsky, 2017), nor to long-term memory retrieval bypassing WM (Della 
Sala & al., 2010). 
Based on the premises that (a) subliminal stimuli can be retained in WM and (b) 
WM can be implicitly activated, I designed a paradigm in which participants are 
not aware that they are engaged in a memory task, but the only way to perform 
the task successfully is to keep a subliminally presented stimulus in memory.  
In this sense, WM is here operationalised as the short term storage of 
information in order to perform an ongoing task (Baddeley, 1986).  
Finding above chance performance would not only confirm previous evidence of 
maintenance of subliminal stimuli and implicit WM activation but would also 
mean that the storage of stimuli in WM can be dissociated from consciousness. 
This would be in line with the suggestion that WM could be composed of 






The paradigm used in the current experiments can be considered as a modified 
version of free-choice priming paradigms.  
In free-choice tasks, participants are required to choose between a set of 
alternative responses without any predetermined criterion, i.e. none of the 
options is more “correct” than the others (Bordener & Mulij, 2009). It has been 
demonstrated that the participants’ choices can be biased toward one of the 
options following a prime, even if the prime is subliminally presented (Klapp & 
Haas, 2005; Kiesel, Wagener, Kunder, Hoffman, Fallgatter & Stocker, 2006, 
Mattler & Palmer, 2012). In two experiments by Kiesel et al (2006), for example, 
participants were instructed to press the left or right button of the keyboard 
following a visible cue. Sometimes a neutral cue was given, and in that case 
participants were free to choose whether to press the left or the right key. 
Strikingly, when a subliminal cue indicating left or right was presented before 
the neutral visible cue, participants’ choices were significantly biased towards 
the direction of the subliminal cue. Thus, the authors demonstrated that 
unperceived stimuli can bias free choices.  
 
In my paradigm, the participants were instructed to perform a guessing game, 
so they are free to choose an option as in the free choice paradigm.  In the game, 
four playing cards are presented in back-view, in a cross formation. Participants 
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are told that in each round one of the cards is the winning card, and asked to 
choose the one they think it is by using the arrow keys of the keyboard (e.g., the 
up-arrow for the top card). As in the free-choice paradigms, these were non 
speeded responses.  
Participants are warned to avoid using any spatial strategy and not to pick up 
the same card all the time, because the winning card is randomly assigned, so 
they have to rely on their instinct. They are informed that the number of 
“winning” choices will be provided at the end of the game.  
Crucially, a cue highlighting one of the cards is subliminally presented before 
each choice. In the following chapters, subliminal presentation was 
accomplished by using CFS in the first series of experiments and backward 
masking in the second series. The winning card is marked by being of a different 
colour compared to the others (e.g. a red card among blue ones). A pilot 
experiment, described in the next chapter, established the effectiveness of this 
type of cue when it is seen consciously. No card is highlighted in 20% of the 
trials, as a control baseline condition for reaction times and subjective reports.  
 
Another variable – retention interval – is manipulated by using various 
durations between the subliminal presentation of the winning card and the 
participants’ choice, in order to detect memory engagement. Following van der 
Ham, Strien, Oleksiak, Wezel, & Postma (2010), I selected delays of 500ms, 
2000ms and 5000ms, plus an additional delay of 1000ms.  Using different 
delays is important, because the literature contains different suggestions about  
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the time required for a sensory input to be transformed into a WM 
representation (for a review see Ricker, Newistein, Bayliss & Barouillet, 2018). 
This process is termed “WM consolidation”, and results in an increased memory 
performance once a certain duration from stimulus presentation has passed. 
This effect has been described even with masked stimuli (Nieuwenstein & 
Wyble, 2014; De Schrijver & Barrouillet, 2017; Ricker & Hardman, 2017).  
In terms of classic memory models (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), WM 
consolidation would be the transfer of content from iconic memory into Short 
Term Memory or WM. 
Usually, 500ms is considered the threshold for iconic memory, a pre-categorical 
and rapidly-decaying memory store whose contents are encoded according to 
the stimulus’ projection on the retina (Öğmen & Herzog, 2016). In his review on 
iconic memory research, however, Dick (1974) suggests that the threshold 
between iconic memory and WM should be placed at 1000ms.  
The delays of 2000ms and 5000ms have been widely used to investigate WM 
retention, particularly in previous work on unconscious WM (e.g., Soto et al, 
2011; Bergstrom et al. 2015 ). According to van der Ham et al. (2010) at these 
delays it is possible to observe slow wave activity related to WM consolidation 
(e.g., McEvoy et al., 1998; Awh et al., 1998; Ruchkin et al., 1997), as well as 
detect possible patterns of decay (Postma, Huntjens, Meuwissen & Laeng, 2006).  
Testing performance after these four different delays – 500, 1000, 2000 and 





The nature of the present task, i.e. the fact that participants were not told about 
the subliminal cue, did not allow the collection of trial by trial visibility ratings, 
but after the main experiment participants performed a perceptual control task. 
Stimuli in this task were the same as in the main experiment (Stein & Sterzer, 
2014), but participants were informed about the presence of a masked red card 
and asked to locate its position. Objective performance was measured, and 
subjective ratings of visibility were collected trial-by-trial on a 4-point PAS, thus 
obtaining both objective and subjective measures of awareness (Yang, 
Brascamp, Kang, & Blake, 2014). Participants whose performance on the control 
task indicates awareness of the subliminal stimulus are removed from the main 
experimental analyses. 
Assessing unawareness with this method falls into the post-hoc data selection 
category of methods criticised by Shanks (2016) for being prone to regression 
to the mean. Positive results, if any, are therefore subjected to further analyses 
as suggested by the author (Shanks, 2016). Furthermore, Bayesian analyses will 
accompany classic statistical analyses, especially when acceptance of the null 
hypothesis is a condition for claiming the absence of awareness. (Dienes, 2015; 
Shanks, 2016; Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014; Vadillo et 
al., 2015). 
 
The proposed methodology takes into accounts the criticism of the conscious 
maintenance hypothesis (Stein et al., 2016) in two ways: in first place, 
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subliminal cues without explicit instructions to remember them make it unlikely 
that guesses were consciously retained; moreover, by using different delays, it is 
possible to evaluate whether the supposed facilitation is effectively due to 
implicit WM activation or to a passive-priming mechanism.  
1.4   Overview of the empirical chapters (spoiler alert) 
Based on the premises outlined above, the first experimental chapter (CH. 2) 
addresses the research question through a series of experiments using CFS, 
leading to conflicting and inconclusive results. 
With the work described in the Chapter 3, I explore possible reasons behind the 
puzzling inconsistency of findings. In a first experiment I used a different 
masking technique, Backward Masking, in a second experiment I provided 
feedbacks on performance after each trial in order to boost motivation, in the 
last experiment of the chapter I used semantic relevant material as stimuli. 
None of these experiments showed evidence for non-conscious working 
memory. 
Finally, in light of my failure to find consistent evidence for non-conscious WM 
activation, in Chapter 4 I went back to the original background of the research 
question, conducting an exact replication of a previous influential study (Soto et 
al., 2011). 
My thesis turned out to be the nightmare of every PhD student, with a collection 
of null results and frustrating attempts to perform exact replications, which 
failed to produce the original results.  
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Despite all of this, I stand by my results: I dedicated a significant effort to 
address possible weaknesses of the paradigm I designed, and to trying to find 
the reason behind the discrepancies between my results and previous 
literature.  
Hopefully, the large number of ‘no’ answers to my research question may make 
a constructive contribution to the debate on the possibility of non-conscious 






2   CONTINUOUS FLASH SUPPRESSION 
2.1   Introduction 
 
Working Memory is considered a volatile information store and control system 
concerning maintenance and online elaboration of information in order to 
pursue current behavioural goals (e.g. Baddeley, 2007). It can be conceived as a 
mental workspace holding and manipulating a limited number of recently 
acquired information for a limited time. There are different theories of WM and 
even if each of them suggests a slightly different definition (Cowan, 2016), there 
is a broad consensus that there is an overlap between some functions of 
working memory and conscious awareness (e.g. Baars & Franklin, 2003; Block, 
1995; Dudai, 2004; Kintsch et al., 1999), commonly defined in experimental 
studies as the ability to report the content of perception. However, a growing 
number of studies and theoretical discussions suggests the possible existence of 
unconscious storage and processing in working memory (e.g. Della Sala et al., 
2010; Hassin et al., 2009; Logie, 2016; Soto & Silvanto, 2014) 
The study by Soto et al. (2011) demonstrated that WM can process stimuli of 
which the participant is not aware. In this study participants were briefly 
presented with a Gabor patch followed by a mask. Participants were instructed 
to try to attend the cue even if they could not see it, in order to perform an 
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eventual discrimination task.  After two seconds, participants were presented 
with a visible Gabor target and asked to judge whether the target was clockwise 
or counter-clockwise oriented with respect to the cue. Subjective ratings of cue 
visibility were collected in order to discard the possibility that the cue was 
consciously perceived. Results showed an above chance performance on trials 
where participants claimed to be unaware of the cue, thus suggesting that the 
patch had been elaborated and maintained in memory even if non-consciously 
perceived.  
Moreover, Hassin and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that WM operations, 
linked to long-term memory representation recall, can be engaged 
unintentionally. In their study, observers were asked to judge as quickly as 
possible whether a dot appearing on the screen was filled or empty. The dot’s 
position of appearance could follow a familiar pattern (for example a zigzag), be 
random or a broken pattern. Participants’ behavioural performance was 
facilitated when the sequence followed a familiar pattern. Participants reported 
being unaware of having extracted the sequence information. As constructing 
the pattern requires the maintenance of the previous dot position and the 
updating of the visual information, the authors concluded that an implicit 
activation of WM process was involved. 
If objects of which we are not aware can be retained in WM, and WM can be 
activated without conscious intention in order to perform a task, then a 
legitimate question is whether WM can be engaged without explicit intention by 
perceiving subliminal material. 
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The experimental procedure proposed here allows assessing the possibility of 
an implicit WM activation with newly acquired subliminal objects, thus 
assessing whether WM can be independent of consciousness.  
2.2     General methods 
The experimental paradigm used a technique called Continuous Flash 
Suppression (CFS). This method is based on binocular rivalry, a visual 
phenomenon whereby if each eye is presented with a different picture, the 
conscious percept will alternate from one picture to the other, but only one at a 
time will be perceived. In CFS, one of the two images is more salient than the 
other, because it is a dynamic and colourful image (most commonly of a type 
known as a ‘mondrian mask’), whereas the other eye is typically shown a static 
image with lower contrast. When this is done, the more salient image will be 
prioritised as a conscious percept. CFS can thus be used to suppress a low 
contrast stimulus displayed to one eye (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). In behavioural 
experiments, the most common way to elicit binocular rivalry or CFS is by using 
a system of mirrors called mirror stereoscope (see figure 2.1), which presents 
each eye with different images that seem to appear at the same location.    
In the current paradigm, one eye is presented with the image of three blue cards 
and one of a different colour, representing the cue, while the other eye is 
presented with the Mondrian mask. The four cards are arranged in a cross 
formation. In 20% of the trials the cue is absent and all the cards are blue. After 
a variable retention interval, participants are supraliminally presented with an 
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array of cards, all blue and in the same cross formation, and asked to guess 
which one is the winning card by selecting it through arrow keys of the 
keyboard.  
Following van der Ham et al. (2010), I selected delays of 500ms, 2000ms and 
5000ms, plus a delay of 1000ms in order to detect a possible fast decay. The 
task is based on the free choice paradigm, which means that participants are 
free to choose between the options. Hence, crucially, participants are not aware 
of performing a memory task; rather, they believe they are playing a guessing 
game, thus allowing us to assess the presence of implicit activation of WM.  
After the experimental session, participants were asked to perform a perceptual 
control experiment in order to check whether and to what extent they perceived 
the prime. The control experiment provided measures of awareness, allowing 
exclusion from the analysis participants who showed a possible breakthrough 
suppression. This procedure, based on post hoc data selection and frequently 
employed in consciousness studies, has been recently criticised because it is 
prone to regression to the mean (Shanks, 2016). This refers to the mathematical 
necessity that when cases are measured on two variables and have a high score 
on one of the variables, they will have a high probability to obtain a score closer 
to the mean on the other variable (Cohen et al., 2003). In the present case, 
participants might have low scores on the perceptual control experiment and 
high scores on the primary task, due to this statistical effect. So, any 
interpretation of possible significant results obtained by using such post-hoc 
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data selection needs to be carefully drawn and accompanied by further analyses 
and controls as suggested by Shanks (2016). 
A facilitation effect at longer retention intervals would strongly demonstrate 
that WM may be effectively engaged outside of awareness and through 
subliminal stimuli. If such facilitation does not arise, it would mean that even if 
WM may process non-conscious stimuli, this takes place only under conscious 
and voluntary activation and that further investigations should be carried out 
about implicit WM engagement. Hence, finding no facilitation effect in a study 
with a subliminal cue in delayed choice tasks would mean that WM needs at 
least some awareness hence posing new questions concerning its implicit 
activation. 
2.2.1 Apparatus  
The experiments were run on a DELL Latitude E6430 running Windows 7 
Professional with a Nvidia GeForce GT 610 graphic device and a 17.1’’ 
Mitsubishi colour display (1024 x 1280) at 85 Hz refresh rate. 
The screen was divided into a left and right half, each half displaying the 
stimulus over a 6.17°x 5.73° visual angle square, surrounded on the left and 
right sides by black and white bars to facilitate binocular fusion. 
 Participants viewed the two halves of the screen through a stereoscope whose 
mirrors were adjusted for each participant at the beginning of the experimental 
session, in order to obtain stable binocular vision. Participants’ head was 




Participants showing a significantly above chance performance were excluded 
from further analyses. 
On the remaining participants mean confidence was calculated. Mean 
confidence of 1 indicates that the participants’ judgment on cue visibility was 
low (I have seen nothing). Mean confidence on correct and incorrect trials was 
compared by a t-test to assess if participants were able to track their 
performance. A significant difference between these ratings, with higher 
confidence on correct than incorrect trials would indicate that participants may 
have some awareness about their performance, thus being not utterly 
unconscious about the cue. 
Finally, a Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat uninformative prior is run to 
test the strength of the evidence for the null hypothesis: the likelihood that 
participants were performing at chance, by guessing, compared to the 
probability that they were performing above chance, so correctly locating the 
cue. Bayesian analyses are crucial in this case, where the assumption that 
participants were actually unaware of the prime is based on the acceptance of 
the null hypothesis (Shanks, 2016), and classical frequentist statistics do not 
test how much the null hypothesis is supported by evidence. To determine the 
Bayes factor, I used an uninformative flat prior, as there was no prior specific 
assumption about the data.  
Analyses on the main experiment were run by excluding the participants 
performing above chance in the control experiment and by cleaning RTs 
following a cut-off of 200 ms and 2500 ms (Whelan, 2008). Performance is 
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analysed through a one-way ANOVA with delay as a within-subject factor on the 
mean accuracy. Classical and Bayesian (flat prior) binomial analyses sorted by 
delays are performed on the percentage of correct answers to compare the 
probability that accuracy was at chance (25%) or above chance. Considering 
four comparisons, Bonferroni adjusted significance threshold would be of α = 
0.012.  
The effect of the cue is also assessed through RTs, with a 4x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present on correct 
trials vs absent) as within-subjects factor.  
2.3  Supraliminal Pilot 
The first pilot aimed at checking whether a red card is a valid cue to influence 
participants’ choice in the absence of explicit instruction.  
To this aim, an experiment with supraliminal prime was performed. The CFS 
apparatus was used even though there was no subliminal presentation of 
stimuli. If the participants' choices were biased towards the position of the red 
cue, it would mean that such a cue is effective and can be used in the subliminal 
experimental paradigm. 
2.3.1 Stimuli 
The stimulus set consisted of 5 images (6.17°x 5.73°) representing four playing 
cards in cross formation and back view. In the control (uncued condition) and 
response stimulus all the cards were blue (luminance: 5.56 cd/m²) on a grey 
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background (0.70 cd/m²), in the other images (cued condition) one of the cards 
was red coloured (22.21 cd/m²) and represented the prime (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2. Stimulus set. In the middle there is the uncued condition (20% of the trials). In the 
four cue condition, the red card represents the prime  
 
2.3.2 Participants and procedure 
Fourteen healthy participants (3 males, mean age= 19.7), recruited among the 
first year undergraduate students of the University of Edinburgh, took part in 
the study for course credits. They all had normal or corrected to normal vision 
and signed the consent form. 
Participants sat with their head on the chin–rest and the stereoscope’s mirrors 
were adjusted to reach binocular vision stabilisation, so that participants’ 
perception of the two halves of the screen was collapsed into one. After that, 
they were presented with the instructions. They were instructed to perform a 
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guessing game: they were going to see four cards, a fixation cross and four cards 
again. They were informed that there was a winning card every round, and 
asked to pick the card they felt to be the winning one, by using the arrow keys of 
the keyboard. At the end of the experiment they would be told how many good 
choices they made, but no feedback was given on individual trials.  
The experiment started after eight practice trials. Choices and reaction times 
were collected. 
Each trial started with a 500ms fixation cross, then the prime was presented for 
500ms both on the right and left sides of the screen. The prime was followed by 
a variable delay period of 500, 1000, 2000 or 5000 milliseconds, during which 
just a fixation cross was displayed. Then the response-stimulus, representing 
the four blue cards, was presented until the subjects’ response. Each stimulus 
was presented 15 times at the four different delays, for a total of 300 trials. 
Participants were given a break after 150 trials. Presentation order of trials was 
randomised.  
2.3.3 Results  
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation 
between cue location and response. The relation between these variables was 
significant, X2 (12, N= 4088)= 4723.22, p < .001, thus demonstrating, along with 
the descriptive statistics described in table 2.1, that participants’ responses are 




stimulus * response Crosstabulation 
   Response 






control 19.5% 20.7% 21.2% 18.6% 
down 62.8% 5.4% 5.1% 7.8% 
left 5.3% 61.9% 6.7% 6.9% 
right 5.0% 6.8% 61.8% 6.3% 
top 7.4% 5.3% 5.2% 60.4% 
Table 2.1. Percentage of response for each stimulus 
 
2.4  Perceptual Pilot 
The second pilot was planned in order to check whether stimuli luminance was 
appropriate to undergo CFS. In this case, participants were asked to indicate the 
position of the red card and how well they saw it. A successful suppression 
would be reflected in a mean confidence rating close to 1 (I have seen nothing) 
and no difference between mean ratings on correct and incorrect trials, which 




2.4.1 Stimuli  
Masks were created as 20 Hz refresh rating GIF consisting of squares in five 
palette colours (yellow, green, blue, black and red) covering a visual angle of 
7.93°. 
Stimulus set was the same as the supraliminal pilot. 
2.4.2 Participants and procedure  
Six participants were recruited among the students (2 males, mean age= 19.17) 
of the University of Edinburgh. They took part in the experiment in exchange of 
course credit. They all had normal or corrected to normal vision and signed the 
consent form. 
The participants were seated with their head on the chin – rest and, after the 
binocular vision stabilisation, were presented with instructions. They were told 
they were going to see a pattern of colours, a fixation cross, and four cards, and 
that sometimes a red card was hidden “behind” the colours. They were asked to 
indicate through the arrow keys in which of the four positions they think the red 
card appeared. Then they had to rate, on a scale ranging from 1 to 4, how well 
they saw the red card.  
Each trial began with a 500ms fixation cross, followed by the presentation of the 
cue to the right eye together with the mask to the left eye, for 500ms. Then, both 
eyes were presented with a 500ms fixation cross, followed by the response 
stimulus. After the response, participants were asked to provide a rating on the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004): both eyes were 
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presented with a rating grid ranging from 1 to 4 and the question “how well did 
you see the red card?”. The rating 1 was labelled as “nothing”, the 2 as “a 
glimpse”, the 3 as “something, but not sure”, the 4 as “clearly seen”. The ratings 
were given with the left hand on the keyboard. 
 
Figure 2.3. Example of a trial sequence: images were presented to the left and right eye 
separately using a stereoscope. The final percept is shown on the right of the picture. Each trial 
begins with a 500 ms fixation cross; then the subliminal cue appeared to the right eye while the 
mask was presented to the left eye for 500ms. After a delay of 500ms in which the fixation cross 
appeared participants were presented with four playing cards and asked to pick the red card by 
pressing the correspondent arrow key. After the choice, they were asked to rate how well they 
saw the red card on a scale from 1 to 4.  
2.4.3 Results  
Mean confidence ratings were higher than expected (M=2.87, sd= 1.01), with 
higher confidence on cue-congruent (M= 3.03, sd= .98) than cue-incongruent 
(M= 2.41, sd= 1.03) trials [t (5) = 2.551, p= .05], with 70% of cue-congruent 
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answers when visibility rating was 4. These results indicate that the stimuli 
used broke the CFS mask and were consciously perceived.   
From the results of the second pilot, the need to modify stimuli luminance 
emerged. Stimuli luminance was lowered through Photoshop and tested 
through a further pilot.  
2.5  Perceptual pilot 2 
This pilot was similar to the previous one, but with the modified version of the 
stimuli 
2.5.1 Stimuli  
Stimulus set was the same as the previous pilot, with the exception that 
luminance was reduced to 0.77 cd/m² for the blue cards, and to 1.39 cd/m² for 
the red card.  
2.5.2 Participants and procedure  
Six healthy participants (2 males, mean age = 23.4) were recruited from among 
the students of the University of Edinburgh. They took part in the experiment 
for £7. They all had normal or corrected to normal vision and signed the consent 
form.  
The procedure was the same as the previous perceptual pilot. 
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2.5.3 Results  
Mean confidence rating was calculated (M=1.52, sd= 0.88). No difference was 
found between confidence ratings on cue-congruent (M= 1.5, sd= 0.8) and cue-
incongruent (M= 1.54, sd= 0.9) trials [t (5) = - .707, p= .51], with 23% of cue-
congruent answers when visibility rating was 4 and an overall accuracy of 27%, 
not significantly different from chance [t (5) = 1.34, p= .23]. 
Results from pilot 3 indicated that the modified stimuli were successfully 
suppressed from awareness using CFS.  
Through three pilots, I ensured that a red card among blue ones would bias 
participants’ choice, and found a reasonable level of luminance to allow stimuli 
suppression under CFS.  At this point, a first version of the main experiment was 
run to analyse preliminary data and fix possible detailed problems with the 
stimuli or procedure. 
2.6   Experiment 1 – Red card and red in the mask 
After assessing the validity of the stimuli through three pilot experiments, 
demonstrating that a red card biases participants’ choices and that stimulus 
luminosity was appropriate to be suppressed, I programmed the first 
experiment. The working hypothesis was that WM can be activated without 
conscious effort by a subliminal cue helping to solve an ambiguous task. Such 
hypothesis would be supported by finding that performance is above chance 
level (25% in this 4-choices case) after a retention interval higher than 500ms. 
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Also, facilitation of the cue (vs uncued trials) on RTs would support the 
maintenance of a memory trace of the cue. 
2.6.1 Stimuli  
Stimulus set was the same as the perceptual pilot 2. 
2.6.2 Participants and procedure  
Twenty healthy participants (2 males, mean age= 19.7 years) were recruited 
from the University of Edinburgh students. They had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and were offered course credits or an honorarium of £7 for 
taking part in the experiment. 
Participants were seated with their head on the chin – rest and, after the 
binocular vision stabilisation, were presented with instructions. They were told 
to engage in a guessing game and informed that they were going to see a pattern 
of colours, a fixation cross and four cards. They were told that there was a 
winning card every round, and asked to pick the card they felt to be the winning 
one, by using the arrow keys of the keyboard. At the end of the experiment, they 
were presented with feedback about how many good choices they had made. 
The experiment proper began after eight practice trials. 
Each trial started with a 500ms fixation cross; then the prime was presented for 
500ms to the right eye, at the same time with the mask appearing on the left 
side. The prime was followed by a variable delay period of 500, 1000, 2000 or 
5000 milliseconds, during which just a fixation cross was displayed. Then the 
response-stimulus, showing the four blue cards, was presented until the 
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participants’ response (Figure 2.4). Each stimulus was presented 15 times at the 
4 different delays, for a total of 300 trials (in random order), a break was given 
after 150 trials.  
Choices and reaction times were collected. 
 
Figure 2.4. Example of a typical trial sequence: images were presented to the left and right 
eye separately using a stereoscope. The final percept is shown on the right of the picture. Each 
trial began with a 500 ms fixation cross; then the subliminal cue appeared to the right eye while 
the mask was presented to the left eye for 500ms. After a delay of either 500, 1000, 2000, or 
5000 ms in which the fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen, participants were 
presented with four playing cards and asked to pick the winning card by pressing the 




2.6.3 Control Experiment  
After the main experiment, every participant performed a control experiment to 
make sure the cue did not break CFS. Participants showing a weak suppression, 
indicated by an above chance ability to localise the cue and a mean confidence 
rating bigger than 1 and higher in the cue-congruent than cue-incongruent 
answers, were excluded from the experiment data analyses. The control 
experiment was built with the same stimuli of the main experiment and 
procedure was identical to the procedure of the perceptual pilots.  
2.6.4 Results  
Two participants were excluded from data analysis due to a failure in stabilising 
binocular vision. Control experiment data were analysed first, in order to 
exclude from the main experimental analysis participants showing a break of 
CFS. 
 Control experiment 
In order to make sure that results were related to the subliminal processing of 
the stimuli, I had to check if any of the participants were able to locate the 
masked cue significantly better than chance when explicitly asked to do so, and 
how good they could evaluate their ability in performing this task. A binomial 
analysis was then performed to compare individual performance with chance 
(25%). Seven participants showing a significantly above chance performance 
were excluded from the experimental analysis.  
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Mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.38, sd= 0.13) and cue-incongruent 
trials (M= 1.36, sd= 0.09) were then compared by a t-test showing no significant 
difference [t (10) =.60, p = .56], with an overall mean confidence rating of 1.37 
(sd= 0.31). This is an index that participants were unable to successfully track 
their performance, so stimuli were properly suppressed from awareness. 
A Bayesian binomial analysis was performed in order to statistically test the 
likelihood that remaining participants’ performance was at chance, compared to 
the probability that it was above chance. Bayes binomial on the frequency of 
choices showed strong evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative 
(BF01 = 13.585). Thus demonstrating that for 11 participants the stimuli were 
properly suppressed from awareness. 
 Main experiment 
Seven participants were excluded from the data analysis after analysing the 
control experiment data. Trials with reaction time higher than 2500ms and 
lower than 200ms (Whelan, 2008) were excluded from analyses (6% of trials; 
mean per participant = 19.08, sd = 20.7, median = 11 [range 1, 60]). 
A one way ANOVA with delay as within subject factor performed on the mean 
accuracy showed no significant effect [F(3, 33) = .750, p = .530 ƞ² = .064]. 
A binomial analysis was performed to estimate whether the performance was 
significantly different from chance. Binomial analysis on performance sorted by 





        Figure 2.5. Percentage of cue-congruent answers for each delay. The red dotted line 
represents chance level (25%). Bars are SEM. 
 
A Bayesian binomial test sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior was 
run to compare the probability that the frequency of choices was at chance 
(0.25) with the probability that it was above chance. Results showed that data 
provide evidence in support of the null hypothesis over the alternative at each 
delay [500ms (BF01 = 16.474); 1000ms (BF01= 7.149); 2000ms (BF01= 6.151) 
5000ms (BF01= 19.080)], which confirms that participants’ performance was at 
chance, and responses were not biased towards the cued card at any of the 
delays. 
Reaction times on cued cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials 
were analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 
1000, 2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subjects factors. 
Results showed no significant main effect of the delay [F (3, 33) = .854, p=.475, 
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ƞ² = .072] or of the cue [F (1, 11) = .628, p = .445, ƞ² = .054] as well as the 
interaction between cue and delay [F (3, 33) =.501, p = .684, ƞ² = .044]. 
Data from the main experiment do not confirm the experimental hypothesis. 
Still, there exists the possibility that the presence of the red colour included 
both in the mask and in the cue created an interference. It is well known in 
working memory literature that if the items of a to-be-remembered list are 
phonologically similar to each other, the memory performance is poorer than 
when they are phonologically different (Conrad, 1964). Visually similar items in 
an array also result in poorer memory performance than when items are 
visually distinct (e.g. Logie, Saito, Morita, Varma, & Norris, 2016). In a paradigm 
closer that used in the current experiments, Blalock (2013) found a disruption 
of VWM consolidation in a colour change detection task when the mask was 
made of the same colours as the array to be remembered.  
To rule out that results of Experiment 1 were due to interference caused by the 
presence of the red colour in the mask and as a prime, I ran a second 
experiment with a new mask in which the colour red was substituted by other 
colours.   
2.7   Experiment 2 – red card with a mask without red 
In order to minimise the interference of the colour red, which in the previous 
experiment was included both in the mask and the cue, and avoid any similarity 




2.7.1 Stimuli  
Masks were created as 20 Hz refresh rating GIF consisting of squares in five 
palette colours (yellow, green, blue, black and dark grey) covering a visual angle 
of 7.93°. Stimulus set was the same as the previous experiment. 
2.7.2 Participants and procedure  
23 healthy participants (6 males, average age= 18.6) were recruited among the 
first year students of the University of Edinburgh, they had normal or corrected 
to normal vision. All participants took part in the experiment in exchange of 
course credits. The procedure was the same as the previous experiment. 
2.7.3 Results  
Control experiment data were analysed in first place, in order to exclude from 
the main experiment’s analysis participants showing a break of CFS. 
Control experiment 
A binomial analysis was then performed to compare individual performance 
with chance (25%). Nine participants showing a significantly above chance 
performance were excluded from the experimental analysis.  
For the remaining 14 participants, mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.31, 
sd= 0.48, 25%) and cue-incongruent trials (M= 1.27, sd= 0.47, 75%) were 
compared by a t-test still showing a significant difference [t (13) = 2.889, p= 
.012]. The overall mean confidence rating of 1.28 (sd= .47) was reasonably close 
to 1 (I have seen nothing), but the possibility that there was some awareness 
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about the choices needs to be taken into account in making any interpretation. 
Again, we run a Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat prior to test the strength 
of the null hypothesis, i.e. that participants’ performance was at chance and they 
were guessing. I found a very strong evidence for H0 (BF01 = 72.522), thus 
supporting the idea that stimuli were still properly suppressed from awareness. 
 Main experiment 
Nine participants were excluded from data analyses after analysing the control 
experiment data. Trials with reaction time higher than 2500 ms and lower than 
200ms were discarded from analyses (4.5% of trials; mean per participant = 
13.8, sd = 14.7, median = 10 [range 2, 56]). 
A one way ANOVA with delay as within-subject factor performed on the mean 
congruency showed an effect of the delay approaching the commonly assumed 
level of significance (95%) [F(3, 39) = 2.617, p = 0.06 ƞ² = .168], with an higher 
congruency at 2000ms delay than at others delay ( p < .05) 
Binomial analysis sorted by delays showed that performance was significantly 
above chance at 2000ms (31%, p< .001), while at chance for the other delays 





Figure 2.6. Percentage of cue-congruent answers for each delay, the red dotted line represents 
the chance level. The performance was significantly above chance after a retention interval of 
2000ms (31%). Bars are SEM. 
 
A Bayesian binomial sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior was run to 
compare further the probability that the accuracy was at chance with the 
probability that it was above chance (0.25). Results confirmed support for the 
hypothesis that performance was above chance at 2000ms delay (BF01= 0.035; 
BF10= 28.189). At the other delays, instead, data were in support of the null 
hypothesis [500ms (BF01 = 48.647); 1000ms (BF01= 9.617); 5000ms (BF01= 
53.379)]. 
Reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subjects factors. Results 
showed a main effect of delay [F (3, 39) = 11.840, p = .001, ƞ² = .477, Figure 2.7]. 
Post hoc comparison showed that RTs were significantly longer at 500 ms (M= 
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855.8, sd= 270.8) compared to 1000ms (M= 721.3, sd= 189.35, p = .001), 
2000ms (M= 704.8, sd= 200.8, p=. 001) and 5000ms (M= 678.95, sd= 209.65, p= 
.001). Cue effect was not significant [F (1, 13) = 1.033, p = .328, ƞ² = .074], as 





Figure 2.7. Mean RTs across conditions on cue-congruent responses vs uncued trials. Only a 
main effect of the delay emerged, with responses being slower after 500 ms retention interval. 
Bars are standard errors. 
 
Results from this experiment seem to support the hypothesis that WM can be 
engaged unintentionally to retain subliminal stimuli. The absence of a priming 
effect at 500 ms excludes the possibility that the results are due to iconic 
memory, while the decrement of the performance at 5000ms seems to indicate 
a decay of the memory trace.  
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Even if this pattern of results seems promising, considering that participants 
showed an ability to discriminate correct and incorrect answers in the control 
experiment (significant t-test between mean confidence on correct and 
incorrect trials), these results need to be interpreted carefully. Thus, I decided 
to replicate them before making any strong conclusion, by running another 
experiment with a cue of a different colour. 
 
2.8  Experiment 3 -  green card 
In the previous experiment participants seemed to unconsciously retain a 
subliminal cue after 2000 ms retention interval, showing an above chance 
performance in a delayed choice. In order to assess whether these results would 
persist, we ran the same experiment with a little variation: in the following 
experiment the red card was replaced by a green card.  
2.8.1 Stimuli  
Masks were created as 20 Hz refresh rating GIF consisting of squares in five 
palette colours (yellow, pink, blue, black and red), and then converted to AVI 
files, covering a visual angle of 7.93°. 
Stimulus set consisted of 5 images (6.17°x 5.73°) representing four playing 
cards in cross formation and back view. In the control (uncued condition) and 
response stimuli all the cards were blue coloured (0.77 cd/m²) on a grey 
67 
 
background (0.70 cd/m²), in the other images (cued condition) one of the cards 
was green coloured (1.317 cd/m²) and represented the prime.  
2.8.2 Participants and procedure  
22 healthy participants (7 males, mean age= 21.3) were recruited from the 
University of Edinburgh students. They had normal or corrected to normal 
vision, signed a consent form and took part in the experiment in exchange of 
course credits. 
The procedure was the same as the previous experiment. 
2.8.3 Results  
 Control experiment 
A binomial analysis was performed to compare individual performance with 
chance (25%). Five participants showing a significantly above chance 
performance were excluded from the experimental analyses.  
Mean confidence ratings on cue-congruent (M= 1.32, sd= .49) and cue-
incongruent trials (M= 1.35, sd= .57) were then compared by a t-test and 
showed no significant difference [t(16) = -1.217, p= .241], with an overall mean 
confidence rating of 1.34 (sd= .55). This demonstrated that the remaining 17 
participants were unable to track their performance successfully, so their 
correct answers were likely to be a guess. A Bayesian binomial analysis with a 
flat prior confirmed in fact that participants’ performance was at chance. We 
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found very strong evidence for H0 (BF01 = 45.461), thus supporting the 
assumption that stimuli were properly suppressed from awareness 
 Main experiment 
Five participants were excluded from data analyses after analysing the control 
experiment data. Trials with reaction time higher than 2500 ms and lower than 
200ms (Whelan, 2008) were excluded from analyses (6.4% of trials; mean per 
participant = 19.2, sd = 26.4, median = 8 [range 3, 103]). 
A one way ANOVA with delay as a within-subject factor performed on the mean 
accuracy showed no effect of the delay [F(3, 48) = 1.688, p = .182 ƞ² = .095]. 
Binomial analysis sorted by delays showed that at 5000 ms, performance was 
above chance (p=.01, 28%), while it was firmly at chance for the other delays 
(Figure 2.8).  
 
Figure 2.8. Percentage of cue-congruent answers for each delay. The red dotted line 




A Bayesian binomial sorted by delays was run with a flat uninformative prior to 
compare the probability that the accuracy was at chance with the probability 
that it was higher than chance (0.25). Results supported null hypothesis over 
the alternative [500ms (BF01 = 45.870); 1000ms (BF01= 40.857); 2000ms 
(BF01= 33.839);5000ms (BF01= 1.862)]. Hence, according to Bayesian analyses, 
evidence from this experiment mostly support the hypothesis that performance 
was at chance. It has to be noted that, differently from the strong support for the 
null hypothesis at earlier delays, at 5000ms retention interval such support was 
just anecdotal, partially confirming the pattern of the classical analyses. 
Reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subjects factors. Results 
showed a main effects of delay [F (3, 45) = 4.498, p = .008, ƞ² = .231]. Post hoc 
comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) showed that RTs at 500 ms (M= 897.05, 
sd= 287.6) were significantly longer than 2000ms (M= 796.9, sd= 303.9, p= .03) 
and to 5000ms (M= 775.15, sd= 279.15, p= .009). The cue effect was not 
significant [F (1, 15) = .066, p = .801, ƞ² = .004], neither was the interaction 




Figure 2.9. Mean RTs across delays on cue-congruent vs uncued trials. Bars are SEM. 
 
Results from this study do not replicate the effect of the experiment with the red 
cue, where performance was facilitated after 2000ms retention. Still, there is 
still some small evidence for implicit retention of subliminal stimuli, as an 
increase in performance was found after 5000ms. This result was not strong 
enough to reach statistical significance on a Bayesian analysis, but cannot be 
ignored. The difference with the previous experiment might, in fact, be 
explained in terms of saliency, as the red colour has been demonstrated to be a 
salient stimulus processed earlier than other contrast-matched stimuli in 
primary visual cortex (Emmanouil, Avigan, Persuh, & Ro, 2013). 
 Thus, a new experiment with both green and red primes needs to be performed 
in order to clarify previous results, as replicating both the patterns would 
confirm that there is a retention of the subliminal cue, and its course is 
influenced by stimulus features. 
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2.9  Experiment 4 - red and green cards intermixed across trials 
To understand whether the difference found in the previous experiments was 
due to physical characteristics of the stimuli, I ran another experiment by using 
both the green and the red card as primes, intermixing them randomly across 
trials. 
2.9.1 Stimuli  
Masks and stimuli were the same as the experiments 2 and 3. Stimuli in the 
green condition were always associated with the mask without green, vice versa 
for the red condition (yellow, pink, blue, black and red - as mask for the green 
cue; yellow, green, blue, black and dark grey -to use with the red cue). 
2.9.2 Participants and procedure  
Twenty-two healthy participants (9 males, average age= 18.7) were recruited 
from the University of Edinburgh students. They had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and took part in the experiment for course credits or £7/hour. 
Colour vision was assessed through Dvorine Colour Plates (4/4 correct). 
The procedure was the same as in the previous experiments, with the exception 
that each stimulus was presented 12 times at the 4 different delays and two 
different colours, for a total of 480 trials. Two breaks were given (every 150 




After the main experiment, every participant performed a control experiment 
with the same stimuli as the main experiment. Participants were informed that 
the pattern of colours was hiding either a red or a green card, and were asked to 
say in which of the four positions they think that card was, and then to rate from 
1 (nothing) to 4 (very well) how well they saw it. The procedure was the same 
as all the previously described control experiments.  
Each stimulus was presented 16 times in the two different colours -with the 
corresponding mask- for a total of 160 trials. 
2.9.3 Results  
Green and red trials were analysed separately both in the control and in the 
main experiment. 
 Control experiment 
A binomial analysis sorted by subjects and prime colour was performed. Four 
participants showing significantly above chance performance with the green 
cue were excluded from the experimental analysis of the green cue trials. 
Similarly, four participants – two of them being the same in both colour 
conditions - performing above chance with the red cue in the control 
experiments were excluded from the analysis of the red cue trials of the main 
experiment.  
For the green cue trials, mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.27, sd= .36)   
and cue-incongruent responses (M= 1.26, sd= .36) were then compared by a t-
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test showing no significant difference [t (17) = 1.28, p= .21], with an overall 
mean confidence rating of 1.26 (sd= .36).  
The same analysis was run for the red trials, with mean confidence on cue-
congruent (M= 1.28, sd= .35) and cue-incongruent responses (M= 1.26, sd= .34) 
showing no significant difference [t (17) = 0.97, p= .34], and an overall mean 
confidence of 1.27 (sd= .34). 
As in the previous experiments, I ran a Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat 
prior on JASP to test the strength of our assumption about the null hypothesis, 
to confirm whether participants’ performance was at chance. There was strong 
evidence for the null hypothesis both in green cue trials (BF01 = 40.541) and in 
red (BF01 = 800.528) cue trials. 
 Main experiment 
Trials with reaction times higher than 2500ms and lower than 200ms were 
excluded from analysis (4.42% of trials. Green: 4.12%; mean per participant = 
9.9, sd = 10.2, median = 7 [range 1, 40]; Red: 4.93%; mean per participant = 
11.9, sd = 14.9, median = 7 [range 0, 61]). 
A repeated measures ANOVA on mean accuracy with delay as within-subject 
factor showed no effect of the delay on the green [F (3, 51) = 1.673, p = .184, ƞ² 
= .090], but this effect was significant with the red card trials [F (3, 51) = 4.399, 
p = .008, ƞ² = .206]. Post-hoc comparison with Bonferroni correction showed 
that there was a significant difference between accuracy at 500 ms (M= .28, 
sd=.07) and 5000 ms (M=.22, sd=.05, p=.012) 
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Binomial analysis sorted by delays and colour showed that performance was 
not significantly different from chance at each delay for the green trials (Figure 
2.10a). For the red trials performance was at chance at each delay, with the 
exception of 500ms, where probability to have 28% of success was significantly 
different from chance (p= .009, Figure 2.10b). 
 





Figure 2.10. Percentage of cue-congruent answers at each delay, with the green cue (a) and the 
red cue (b). The red dotted line represents the chance level (25%). Performance is at chance at 
each delay, with the exception of 500ms delay in the red cue condition (b), with 28% of cue-
congruent answers (p=.009).Bars are SEM. 
 
A Bayesian binomial sorted by delays was run with a flat uninformative prior to 
compare the probability that the accuracy was at chance (null hypothesis- H0) 
with the probability that it was above chance (alternative hypothesis- H1). 
Results with the green cue showed support for the null hypothesis over the 
alternative at [500ms (BF01 = 66.792);1000ms (BF01= 8.297); 2000ms (BF01= 
63.739) 5000ms (BF01= 102.845)]. Also results with the red cue showed 
evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative at [500ms (BF01 = 6.430); 
1000ms (BF01= 43.820);2000ms (BF01= 66.792) 5000ms (BF01= 106.300)]. 
Hence, the Bayesian test does not confirm that performance at 500ms in the red 
cue trials was different enough from chance to disconfirm the null hypothesis.   
On trials with the green cue, reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs 
responses in uncued trials were analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 
ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as 
within subjects factors. Results showed a main effect of delay [F (3, 51) = 6.237, 
p =.001, ƞ² = .268]. Post hoc comparison (Bonferroni corrected) showed that 
RTs were significantly longer at 500 ms (M= 903.7, sd= 357.05) compared to 
2000ms (M= 778.5, sd= 320.45, p= .002) and to 5000ms (M= 784.6, sd= 307.45, 
p= .004). The effect of the cue was not significant [F (1, 17) =.141, p = .712, ƞ² = 
.008] as well as the interaction between cue and delay [F (3, 51) = 1.901, p = 
.141, ƞ² = .101, Figure 2.11a]. 
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The same analysis on the red cued trials similarly showed a main effect of delay 
[F (3, 51) = 6.970, p=.000, ƞ² = .291], with significantly longer RTs at 500 ms 
(M= 913.45, sd= 375.7) compared to 2000ms (Mean= 791, sd= 312.75, p= .004) 
and to 5000ms (M= 767.75, sd= 268.65, p=.000). The effect of the cue was not 
significant [F (1, 17) = 6.970, p = .659, ƞ² = .012], as well as the interaction 




Figure 2.11 Mean RTs across conditions on cue-congruent vs uncued trials in the green block 
(a) and the red block (b). In both analyses, only a main effect of the delay emerged, with 





Results and patterns from this experiment do not replicate any of the previous 
findings, with no significant above chance performance apart from 500ms delay 
with the red cue, not confirmed by Bayesian test and not resembling the 
previous results or patterns. This made the interpretation somewhat puzzling. 
One possible explanation is that constant subliminal exposure to the same 
stimulus can differentially affect the processing of such stimulus compared to an 
intermixed presentation. To address this possibility, I carried out another 
experiment where the green and the red prime were presented in two different 
blocks, whose order was counterbalanced across participants. 
2.10  Experiment 5 - red and green card in blocks 
To further explore the possibility that WM can be implicitly activated by a 
subliminal stimulus in order to perform a task, I ran four experiments with 
different results. In the first experiment the absence of any effect of the cue 
could be attributed to an interference of the red colour in the mask on the 
processing of the red cue. When this issue was addressed by modifying the 
mask in the second experiment, a significant effect of the cue on performance 
emerged after 2000 ms delay. This was not the case in the 3rd experiment, 
where the cue was green, and there was a trend to perform above chance after 
5000 ms delay. The lack of replication of these results in the 4th experiment 
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might be due to the intermixed presentation of the two different cues across 
trials.  
For these reasons, I performed another experiment in which the red cue and the 
green cue were presented to every participant in separate blocks. In this way I 
tried to replicate the two different effects found in the Experiments 2 and 3, 
making sure that the alternate presentation of the colours does not create any 
interference.  
2.10.1   Stimuli  
Stimuli were the same as in the previous experiment. 
2.10.2   Participants and procedure  
Nineteen healthy participants (6 males, average age= 19.6) were recruited from 
among the University of Edinburgh students. They had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and took part in the experiment for course credits or £7/hour. 
Colour vision was assessed through Dvorine colour plates (4/4 correct).  
The procedure was the same as for the previous experiments, with the 
exception that each of the 5 stimuli was presented 15 times in two different 
colours at 4 delays (500, 1000, 2000, 5000 ms), for a total of 600 trials. Breaks 
were given after each block of 150 trials. Red cues and green cues were 
presented in different blocks, whose presentation order was counterbalanced 
across participants (R-G-R-G/G-R-G-R/ R-R-G-G/G-G-R-R). Choices and reaction 
times were collected. 
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After the main experiment, each participant performed a control experiment 
with the same stimuli as the main experiment. Participants were informed that 
the pattern of colours was hiding a red card (for the red block) or a green card 
(for the green block) and were asked to indicate in which of the four positions 
they think the differently coloured card was presented, and then to rate from 1 
to 4 how well they saw it. Presentation order was counterbalanced across 
participants. The procedure was the same as the previous control experiment, 
each stimulus was presented 15 times in two different colour and one delay 
(500ms), for a total of 150 trials. 
2.10.3   Results 
 Control experiment 
A binomial analysis sorted by cue colour was performed on individual 
performance. Ten participants showing a significantly above chance 
performance in the green cue blocks were excluded from the experimental 
analysis of the green cue. Eight participants performing above chance in the red 
cue blocks of the control experiments were excluded from the analysis of the 
red cue blocks of the main experiment. Six of them were excluded from both 
conditions.  
For the green trials, mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.40, sd= .55)   and 
cue-incongruent responses (M= 1.34, sd= .52) were then compared by a t-test 
showing a difference approaching the commonly assumed significance level of 
95% [t (8) = 2.09, p= .06], although the overall mean confidence rating of 1.36 
(sd= .53) was reasonably close to 1 (I have seen nothing). The possibility that 
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there was some awareness about the choices needs to be taken into account in 
making any interpretation of any possible results with the green cue. 
For the red cue trials, mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.34, sd= .27) and 
cue-incongruent trials (M= 1.31, sd= .27) were also compared by a t-test 
showing no significant difference [t (9) = 1.37, p= .20], with an overall mean 
confidence rating of 1.32 (sd= .27). As in the previous experiments, I ran a 
Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat prior to test the strength of the null 
hypothesis (performance is at chance) for both prime colours. I found anecdotal 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis (BF01 = 0.571) in the green block, and 
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative for the red block 
(BF01= 4.224). The weaker suppression compared to the previous experiments 
can be due to the long exposure to the stimuli, which has been shown to reduce 
the effectiveness of suppression (Carmel, 2016), so the results of the main 
analyses have to be interpreted carefully. 
Main experiment 
Trials with reaction time higher than 2500ms and lower than 200ms were 
excluded from analysis (5.46% of the total trials. Green: 5.7%; mean per 
participant = 17, sd = 17.2, median = 12 [range 2, 54]; Red: 5.12%; mean per 
participant = 15.4, sd = 16.3, median = 12 [range 1, 58]). 
A repeated measures ANOVA on mean accuracy with delay as within-subject 
factor showed no effect of the delay on the green [F (3, 24) = 1.069, p = .381, ƞ² 
= .118] and red card trials [F (3, 30) = 0.314, p = .815, ƞ² = .030] 
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Binomial analysis sorted by delays and colour showed that performance with 
the green prime was significantly above chance at a delay of 5000ms (p = .002), 
while at chance for the other delays (Figure 2.12a).  The performance with the 
red prime was at chance at each delay (Figure 2.12b). 
a)  
b)  
Figure 2.12. Percentage of cue-congruent answers at each delay, with the green cue (a) and the 
red cue (b). The red dotted line represents the chance level (25%). Performance is at chance at 
each delay, with the exception of 5000ms delay in the green cue condition (a), with 30% of the 




Again, I ran a Bayesian binomial sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior 
to compare the probability that the accuracy was at chance (null hypothesis) 
with the probability that it was higher than chance, to confirm or discard the 
results of classical analysis. Results for the green block showed more evidence 
for the null hypothesis over the alternative at every delay [500ms (BF01 = 
12.941); 1000ms (BF01= 3.341); 2000ms (BF01= 17.656)] but 5000ms, where 
there is moderate evidence for the alternative hypothesis over the null (BF01= 
0.272, BF10= 3.680).  
Results from the red block showed a very strong evidence for the null 
hypothesis over the alternative at every delay [500ms (BF01 = 32.145); 1000ms 
(BF01= 11.979); 2000ms (BF01= 41.458); 5000ms (BF01= 38.381)].  
On green trials, reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in 
uncued trials were analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with 
delay (500, 1000, 2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subjects 
factors. Results showed a main effect of delay [F (3, 24) = 4.499, p = .01, ƞ² = 
.360]. Post hoc comparison with Bonferroni correction showed longer RTs at 
500ms (Mean= 817.35, sd= 260.2) compared to 5000ms (Mean= 688.7, sd= 
275.3, p =.01). The effect of the cue was not significant [F (1, 8) = 1.08, p=.328, 
ƞ² = .119], as well as the interaction between cue and delay [F (3, 24) = 2.60, 
p=.075, ƞ² = .245, Figure 2.13a].  
Similarly, the same analysis conducted on the red trials showed a main effect of 
delay [F (3, 30) = 3.007, p = .046, ƞ² = .231], with significantly longer RTs at 
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500ms (Mean= 777.6, sd= 266.25) compared to 5000ms (Mean= 661.3, sd= 
248.3, p= .03). The effect of the cue was not significant [F (1, 10) = 1.93, p=.195, 
ƞ² = .162], while the interaction was only close to the commonly assumed 
significance level threshold [F (3, 30) = 2.71, p=.06, ƞ² = .213, Figure 2.13b].  
a)  
b)  
Figure 2.13. Mean RTs across conditions on cue-congruent vs uncued trials in the green block 
(a) and the red block (b). In both analyses, only a main effect of the delay emerged, with 





Results from this experiment seem to show a facilitation effect again with the 
green card after 5000ms, but the weakness of suppression emerged from the 
analysis on the control experiment with the green cue makes challenging to 
exclude that such a result was due to partial awareness. Also, the lack of any 
effect with the red card does not replicate the effects found with the red cue in 
Experiment 2. 
2.11 Experiment 6 –  Replication of Experiment 2 
Considering that the Experiment 2, with the red cue and the mask without the 
red, was the only one showing a strong effect among all the other experiments, 
running an exact replication of that experiment could help to clarify the 
ambiguous results presented in the chapter. Results from the Experiment 2 
showed that performance was above chance after 2000ms retention, which 
would have indicated that encoding into WM required time to achieve. However, 
this effect was not replicated with small experimental variations through 3 
further experiments.  
If running an exact replication confirms the result, then the ambiguity of the 
results from the other experiments might be considered and investigated as 
perceptual effects arising from the experimental variations. As CFS is a 
relatively new technique, many of its perceptual aspects and how these affect 
experimental outcomes are still under investigation. On the other side, a lack of 
replication would undermine the interpretation of the results from Experiment 
2, suggesting that they might have arisen by chance, as also suggested by the 
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small support from the BF value.  In order to verify this possibility, I repeated 
the procedure for Experiment 2. 
2.11.1  Stimuli  
All stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2 
2.11.2   Participants and procedure 
Eleven healthy participants (2 males, average age= 18.01) were recruited 
among the first year students of the University of Edinburgh, they had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. Colour vision was assessed through Dvorine Colour 
Plates (4/4). All participants took part in the experiment in exchange of course 
credits. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. 
2.11.3   Results  
 Control experiment 
A binomial analysis was run on individual performance. Five participants 
showing a significantly above chance performance were excluded from the 
experimental analysis. This is a high exclusion rate, so a possible lack of power 
(0.06 of power in detecting an accuracy of 31% as in the Experiment 2) has to 
be considered before drawing any conclusion from this data. Still, this 
experiment only is only a further replication aimed to give an indication about 
the lack of effects in the previous two experiments with the same red cue.  




Mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.39, sd= 0.69) and cue-incongruent 
trials (M= 1.42, sd= 0.82) were compared by a t-test showing no significant 
difference [t(5) = -0.62, p= .55]. The overall mean confidence rating was of 1.41 
(sd= .79).  
Again, I ran a Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat prior on accuracy to test the 
strength of my prediction about the null hypothesis, assuming that participants’ 
performance was at chance. There was extreme evidence for H0 (BF01 = 
623.002), thus confirming that stimuli were adequately suppressed from 
awareness. 
Main experiment 
Five participants were excluded from the data analysis after analysing the 
control experiment data. Trials with reaction time higher than 2500 ms and 
lower than 200ms were discarded from analyses (5.4% of trials; mean per 
participant = 16.3, sd = 13.4, median = 14 [range 0, 36]). 
A one way ANOVA with delay as within-subject factor performed on the mean 
accuracy showed no effect of the delay [F(3, 15) = 0.016, p=.997  ƞ² = .003]. 
 Binomial analysis sorted by delays showed that performance was not 




        Figure 2.14. Percentage of cue-congruent answers for each delay. The red dotted line 
represents the chance level (25%) 
 
A Bayesian binomial sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior showed 
very strong evidence for the null hypothesis (performance was at chance) over 
the alternative (performance was higher than chance) at every delay [500ms 
(BF01 = 40.690); 1000ms (BF01= 34.687); 2000ms (BF01= 36.195; 5000ms 
(BF01= 40.832)] 
Reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subjects factors. Results 
showed no significant effect of delay [F (3, 15) = .702, p = .566 , ƞ² = .123], no 
significant effect of the cue [F (1, 5) = .136, p = .727 , ƞ² = .027], and no 
significant interaction [F (3, 15) = .153, p =.926 , ƞ² = .030, Figure 2.15a]. The 
absence of any significant effect of the delay on RTs, consistently encountered 
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across the previous experiments, might be due to the very high variability of the 




Figure 2.15. Mean RTs across conditions on cue-congruent vs uncued trials. No main effect or 
interaction was present. Bars are standard errors. 
 
Results from this experiment do not replicate the significant outcome that 
emerged in a previous identical experiment, thus indicating that those results 
were not reliable and the lack of replication in the following experiments was 
not due solely to experimental manipulation. 
 
Experiment delay %correct pvalue BF01 
Red cue and  
red in the mask 
500 27% .230 16.474 
1000 27% .08 7.149 
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2000 27% .07 6.151 
5000 26% .267 19.080 
 
Red cue and mask 
without red 
500 24% .642 48.647 
1000 27% .111 9.617 
2000 31% .000 0.035 
5000 26% .265 53.379 
 
Green cue 500 25% .541 45.870 
1000 25% .483 40.857 
2000 25% .398 33.839 
5000 28% .014 1.862 
 
Green and Red  
cues intermixed 
 (green) 
500 23% .196 66.792 
1000 26% .418 8.297 
2000 24% .450 63.739 
5000 23% .09 102.845 
 
Green and Red  
cues intermixed  
(red) 
500 28% .009 6.430 
1000 25% .545 43.820 
2000 24% .743 66.792 
5000 32% .975 106.3 
 
Green and Red 
 cues in blocks 
(green) 
500 26% .209 12.941 
1000 28% .04 3.341 
2000 27% .287 17.656 
5000 31% .002 0.272 
 
Green and Red  
cues in blocks  
(red) 
500 26% .459 32.145 
1000 27% .138 11.979 
2000 25% .614 41.458 




Red cue replication 500 25% .487 40.690 
1000 27% .113 34.687 
2000 25% .423 36.195 
5000 25% .397 40.832 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of the main experimental results.  
 
2.12   Discussion 
The aim of the experiments reported here was to investigate if WM could be 
implicitly activated by a subliminal cue, thus questioning the depth of the 
relationship between WM and awareness. Previous studies suggested that 
subliminal processing could be carried out within WM (e.g., Soto et al., 2011) 
and that WM could be engaged without explicit instructions and awareness 
(Hassin et al., 2009). In the current study we addressed the issue of whether, in 
order to perform an ambiguous task, people can engage WM to retain a 
subliminal prime without being instructed to do so and without awareness of 
both the prime and the memory activation. Differently from previous 
experiments on implicit WM activation using stimuli available as long-term 
memory representations (Hassin et al., 2009), in the present study no semantic 
processing was implied, it was a simple but pure Visual task. With the present 
paradigm, we also tried to address some criticisms raised against previous 
studies of WM without awareness (Stein et al., 2016). I controlled for the 
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possibility of conscious maintenance of a guess due to the subliminal perception 
by using different delays and performing a perceptual experiment as a control 
after each main experiment. 
Experiment 1 (red both in the mask and in the prime) was inconclusive. 
However, it raised the interesting question of whether a colour in the Mondrian 
mask could affect the colour processing of a suppressed stimulus. This indicates 
how important it is to pay considerable attention to the method chosen to 
suppress stimuli from awareness. 
In the subsequent study (Experiment 2) I observed a performance significantly 
above chance after the 2000ms delay. This result would indicate that 
participants were implicitly engaging their WM with subliminal stimuli after a 
consolidation period and fast decay. This finding did not replicate (Experiment 
3), however performance significantly above chance emerged after 5000ms. To 
ascertain whether the difference between these two outcomes was due to the 
physical characteristics of the colours (red vs green) or to a statistical fluke we 
performed a further experiment (Experiment 4) by intermixing red and green 
trials whereby the target was the red card with trials whereby the target was 
the green card, with the respective masks. The outcome was at odds with the 
previous findings: no significant effect for the green card and a weak 
significance with the red card after 500ms. In a further study (Experiment 5) the 
green and the red cues were presented in blocks, in counterbalanced order, with 
the respective Mondrian masks. This experiment showed a partial replication of 
the effect with the green prime (above chance performance after 5000ms 
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delay), but chance performance with the red prime. The attempt to replicate the 
results of Experiment 2 was unsuccessful in Experiment 6, with no significant 
above chance performance. 
In conclusion, results from seven experiments failed to demonstrate the implicit 
activation of WM with unconscious, non-semantic visual stimuli. The apparently 
significant results found in experiments 2, 3 and 4 are inconsistent and do not 
replicate. Thus they seem to be due to random statistical variation, as also 
supported by the Bayesian analyses.  
The poor statistical power of these experiments, due to the high exclusion rate 
of participants after analyses of the control experiments, will be addressed by 
an overall analysis in supplemental material, pooling all the experiments 
together (b). Results from each experiment including the entire participants’ 
sample will also be provided in supplemental material (a). Both analyses will be 
in support of the absence of any effect. 
It is clear that further investigation is needed in order to draw firm conclusions. 
In first place, there is the need to verify a possible influence of the masking 
method. As CFS is becoming widely used in unconscious processing literature, 
some studies comparing this method to other masking techniques as backward 
masking and metacontrast masking revealed significant differences in the 
perceptual effects of the different methods. In particular weak or absent 
perceptual priming is often found under CFS compared to other masking 
techniques (Faivre, Berthet, & Kouider, 2014; Izatt, Dubois, Faivre, & Koch, 
2014; Peremen & Lamy, 2014, Moors, Hesselmann, Wagemans, & van Ee, 2017). 
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For this reason, it is advisable to take into account these differences when 
running studies on subliminal perception (Izatt et al., 2014).  
On this basis I adapted the paradigm to perform it with Backward Masking, 
which is the masking method used in the study by Soto et al. (2011), first 




3 BACKWARD MASKING 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I described a series of experiments aimed at assessing if 
WM could be implicitly activated by stimuli suppressed from awareness by CFS, 
in order to perform a task. The outcome from 6 experiments did not support 
this hypothesis. However, to support a negative finding more robust evidence is 
needed. One concern is related to the method used to suppress the stimuli from 
awareness, as it is possible that CFS might not be the best technique for the 
purpose. Different suppression methods, in fact, have been shown to differently 
affect stimulus processing (Marcus Rothkirch & Hesselmann, 2017).  
CFS is based on the presentation of a stimulus to one eye while the other eye is 
presented with a dynamic pattern which, due to binocular rivalry, will suppress 
the stimulus from consciousness for several seconds (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). 
This suppression technique is relatively recent, but produced promising results 
(Hassin, 2013, Sklar et al., 2012). It has been employed in many experiments 
showing high-level elaboration taking place outside of conscious awareness, like 
reading small sentences and performing arithmetic (Sklar et al.2012), 
processing words meaning (Costello, Jiang, Baartman, McGlennen, & He, 2009) 
and detecting scene congruency (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011).  
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Bergström & Eriksson, (2015) found that participants could retain in WM 
stimuli suppressed from awareness through CFS for up to 15 seconds.  
However, some recent attempted replications of these studies did not reach the 
same conclusions: Rabagliati et al., (2018), for instance, failed to replicate 
Sklar’s et al. (2012) results on unconscious reading, recommending particular 
attention to false positives in this kind of study. Similar conclusions were drawn 
by Moors, Boelens, van Overwalle, & Wagemans, (2016) after they conducted a 
Bayesian reanalysis of the study by Mudrik et al. (2011). 
Hesselman and Moors (2015) pointed out that the high expectations about the 
possibility to study unconscious high level cognition using CFS seem in contrast 
with decades of studies exploring the effects of binocular rivalry, on which CFS 
is based, and mostly demonstrating limited cognitive processing under this 
manipulation (for a review see Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, Hesselmann, et 
al., 2014). Also, the activity of the early visual cortex seems to be dramatically 
reduced by CFS masks (Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013), and it has been 
suggested that this could leave only some basic features of the suppressed 
object available for processing (Hesselmann & Moors, 2015; Moors et al., 2017). 
It could be the case, then, that CFS not only suppressed the present stimuli from 
conscious processing but also disrupted the unconscious representation of their 
key features.  
An alternative to CFS to render stimuli subliminal is Backward Masking (BM), 
which involves a very brief presentation of the stimulus (shorter than 50 ms) 
immediately followed by a mask (Faivre, Berthet, & Kouider, 2012). 
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BM and CFS seem to affect visual processing in a different way. A common idea 
of visual processing in the brain considers a division between two visual 
streams (Goodale & Milner, 1992): the ventral stream has been generally 
associated with the processing of visual shapes and objects, while the dorsal 
pathway seems to be involved in reaching and grasping behaviour. Fang & He 
(2005), in a fMRI study, found that stimuli made invisible by interocular 
suppression produced activation in the dorsal cortical area, suggesting that CFS 
may selectively affect the ventral visual pathways, leaving intact the features 
processed by the dorsal stream (Lin & He, 2009). This idea was confirmed by 
Almeida, Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza (2008), who found priming effects 
under BM with several stimulus categories (e.g., tools or animals), while priming 
under CFS was only restricted to tools and manipulable objects. The latter 
category is, in fact, considered to be processed in the dorsal visual pathway 
(Fang & He, 2005). 
 This theory is debated, and the results are not conclusive (Hebart & 
Hesselmann, 2012; Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, Hesselmann, et al., 2014; 
Rothkirch & Hesselmann, 2018), but still the possibility that different masking 
methods affect the visual processing in different ways cannot be ignored.  
Therefore, I ran a further series of experiments following a procedure similar to 
the one described in the previous chapter, but using BM instead of CFS.  
Over and above the use of a different masking method, other methodological 
variations have been introduced in the experiments reported in this chapter. 
One of these consisted of providing feedback after each trial, in order to rule out 
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the possibility that the lack of reinforcement might have lead participants to 
neglect the cue (Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009). It has been demonstrated, in fact, 
that top-down attribution of cue relevance and the presence of explicit feedback 
do have a significant impact on accuracy in subliminal priming and implicit 
learning experiments (e.g. Mealor & Dienes, 2013). This motivational factor 
could have played an essential role in modulating the present results, so the 
second experiment of this chapter aims to establish whether this was the case.  
In a further experiment, I used stimuli selected to activate semantic 
representations, to address the possibility that implicit WM activation only 
concerns semantic and long-term memory retrieval. The influence of knowledge 
and long-term memories on WM performance has been widely acknowledged 
(see Logie, 2016). Della Sala et al. (2010), for example, found an implicit WM 
activation for familiar but not unfamiliar stimuli in brain-damaged patients. 
Also, following Hassin’s (2009) demonstration of implicit WM activation with 
familiar geometrical patterns, Soto and Silvanto (2014) suggested that WM 
functions hardwired by experience might lead such an activation.  
Although playing cards can be considered objects belonging to semantic 
knowledge, this is not the case for the spatial configuration of a red card among 
three blue cards, which was the actual feature to remember in my own 
experiments. If the only way to engage WM outside awareness is by activating 
semantic representation, then the meaningless location of an item could not 
trigger it, whereas meaningful stimuli like the sun or a heart to be associated 
with their typical colour, should. 
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In sum, the experiments reported in the present chapter address the question of 
implicit WM activation with subliminal stimuli along with some methodological 
issues: first, would BM experiments confirm the results obtained with CFS? 
Second, does feedback following the cue play any role? Third, could implicit WM 
activation be related only to semantic information retrieval? To answer these 
questions, I adapted the experimental paradigm described in the previous 
chapters to a backward masking setting (to answer the questions 1 & 2), and a 
new set of stimuli was created to address the possibility of implicit semantic 
activation.  
Finding above chance performance or facilitation of the cued condition 
compared to the uncued condition on reaction times at longer retention 
intervals would mean that WM can be activated without the intention to process 
subliminal objects. Also, it would mean that such an effect is modulated by 
different factors, like masking methods, reinforcement and type of to-be-
remembered stimuli. 
3.2   General methods 
All the experiments were based on BM as a method to suppress stimuli from 
awareness. This consists of presenting a stimulus binocularly and very briefly, 
immediately followed by a mask.  
In the present paradigm, the image of three blue cards and one of a different 
colour was presented in the middle of the screen for 24 ms, followed by a 
colourful mask. No card was highlighted in 20% of the trials. After a variable 
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retention interval, participants were presented with 4 blue cards in the same 
cross formation. Crucially, participants were not aware of the presence of a to-
remember cue, thus allowing us to investigate implicit WM activation. They 
were instructed to perform a guessing game, trying to pick the winning card in 
each trial. They were instructed to follow their instinct in picking the card, and 
avoid any sequential strategy or picking the same card all the time. 
After the experimental session, participants were asked to perform a perceptual 
control experiment in order to check whether and to what extent they perceived 
the cue. The control experiment provided measures of awareness, allowing 
exclusion from the analysis subjects who showed an unsuccessful suppression. 
As in the previous chapter, to account for the criticisms recently raised against 
this post hoc data selection (Shanks, 2016), in case of significant results, 
additional analyses including the performance from all the participants have 
been reported as supplemental materials. 
3.2.1 Apparatus 
Backward Masking experiments were run on a DELL Latitude P991 laptop 
running Windows 7 Professional with a Nvidia GeForce GT 610 graphics device 
and an 18’’ Mitsubishi colour display (1280 x 960) at 85 Hz refresh rate. 
Participants’ head was stabilised by a chin-rest placed at a viewing distance of 
57 cm. The experiment was implemented in PsychoPy2 since for brief 
presentation of visual stimuli better control of timing was required than is 
possible with Eprime (Garaizar, Vadillo, & Lo, 2014). 
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3.3 Experiment 7 - Guessing game with BM 
In the previous chapter, I described 6 studies whereby I employed CFS to hide a 
memory cue from consciousness and assess if participants still maintain such a 
cue in WM to perform a delayed choice. Results did not support such a 
possibility: some significant results emerged, but they were weak and did not 
replicate. 
If this inconsistency was due to CFS being inadequate to allow the subliminal 
processing of the present stimuli’s features,  then running the same experiment 
by using BM should give a clearer insight: finding above chance performance 
after long delays would indicate that the lack of consistent results in the 
previous experiments was due to an excessive disruption of  stimulus feature 
processing under CFS; finding no above chance performance or facilitation of 
the cue also with BM would suggest that weakness in the previous results was 
likely to be due to the absence of the phenomena under investigation, although 
there would be more methodological questions to face before reaching this 
conclusion, such as the nature of the stimuli or motivational factors as explained 
above. 
3.3.1 Stimuli 
The stimulus set consisted of 5 images (6.17°x 5.73°) representing four playing 
cards arranged in a cross formation and viewed from the back (Figure 3.1). In 
the control (uncued condition) and response stimulus all the cards were blue 
coloured (5.56 cd/m² luminance) on a grey background (0.70 cd/m²). In the 
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other images (cued condition) one of the cards was red coloured (1.39 cd/m²) 
and served as a cue.  
Masks consisted of a 20 fps AVI files showing flickering squares in five palette 
colours (yellow, green, blue, black and dark grey), covering a visual angle of 
7.93°. 
 
Figure 3.1. Stimulus set: images represent stimuli in the uncued condition, the four cued 
condition, and a screenshot of the mask. For illustration purposes, contrast is increased 
compared to the actual stimuli. 
 
3.3.2 Participants and procedure  
15 healthy participants (3 males, mean age= 20 years) were recruited among 
students of the University of Edinburgh. They had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and took part in the experiment for course credits or £7. Colour 
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vision was assessed through the Dvorine Colour Plates (4/4 correct). One 
participant failed to complete the task and was excluded from data analysis. 
Participants sat with the head on the chin – rest and were presented with 
instructions. They were asked to complete a guessing game and informed that 
they were going to see a pattern of colours, a fixation cross and four cards. In 
each trial, one of these cards was a winning card, and they had to guess which 
one it was by pressing the arrow keys on the keyboard. At the end of the 
experiment, they were presented with feedback about how many good guesses 
were made. The experiment started after eight practice trials. 
Each trial started with a 500ms fixation cross; then the prime was presented for 
2 frames (24ms) in the centre of the screen, then the mask appeared for 8 
frames (100ms). The mask offset was followed by a variable delay period of 
500, 1000, 2000 or 5000 milliseconds, during which just a fixation cross was 
displayed. Then the response-stimulus, consisting of the four blue cards, was 
presented until the subject’s response (see figure 3.2).  
Each stimulus was presented 15 times at the 4 different delays, for a total of 300 




Figure 3.2. Example of a typical trial sequence: images were presented in the middle of the 
screen. Each trial began with a 500 ms fixation cross; then the subliminal cue appeared for 24ms 
immediately followed by a mask for 100ms. After a delay of either 500, 1000, 2000, or 5000 ms 
in which the fixation cross is shown in the middle of the screen, participants were presented 
with four playing cards and asked to pick the winning card by pressing the corresponding arrow 
key. 
 
3.3.3  Control Experiment 
After the main experiment, every participant performed a control experiment to 
make sure the prime was not consciously detected. The control experiment 
employed the same stimuli and procedure of the main experiment, with the 
exception that (1) participants were explicitly asked to detect the masked red 
card’s position, (2) there was only a 500ms delay between the mask and the 
response-stimulus, (3) confidence ratings were collected after each choice, as in 
the previous control experiments. 
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3.3.4 Results  
 Control experiment 
In order to make sure that any positive result in the main experiment was 
related to subliminal processing of the stimuli, I had to assess whether any of 
the participants were able to locate the masked cue significantly better than 
chance when explicitly asked to do so, and how thoroughly they could evaluate 
their ability in performing this task. A binomial analysis was then performed to 
compare individual performance with chance (25%).  
Two participants showing significantly above chance performance and were 
excluded from the experimental analyses. 
Following these exclusions, mean confidence ratings on cue-congruent (M= 
1.41, sd= .48) and cue-incongruent trials (M= 1.43, sd= .53) were compared by a 
t-test and showed no significant difference [t (11) = -1.15, p= .27]. This 
demonstrates that participants were unable to track their performance 
successfully, so stimuli were properly suppressed from awareness (mean 
proportion of correct= 25.17, sd =2.4) 
As in the previous experiments, I ran a Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat 
prior to test the strength of the null hypothesis: how likely participants’ 
discrimination of the cue was at chance. I found extreme evidence for H0 (BF01 
= 110.843), meaning that performance was not different from chance and thus 
confirming that participants were unaware of the cue position.  




Trials with reaction times higher than 2500ms and lower than 200ms (Whelan, 
2008) were excluded from analysis (8.39% of the trials, mean per participant = 
24, sd = 21.5, median = 16.5 [range 1, 74]). 
A repeated measures one way ANOVA of the different delays performed on 
mean accuracy showed no significant effect [F(3, 33) = .147, p = .931 ƞ² = .013]. 
Binomial analysis sorted by delays showed that performance was at chance at 
each delay (figure 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The proportion of cue-congruent answers for each delay, the red dotted line 
indicates the chance level (25%). Performance is at chance at each delay. Bars are SEM. 
 
I ran a Bayesian binomial test sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior to 
assess whether the evidence supported the null hypothesis (i.e. accuracy was at 
chance, 25%) or the alternative (that accuracy was higher than chance). Results 
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showed strong evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative at each 
delay [500ms (BF01 = 19.208); 1000ms (BF01= 44.975); 2000ms (BF01= 
38.025); 5000ms (BF01= 36.128)].  
Reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as factors. Results showed a main 
effect of delay [F (3, 33) = 7.7250, p = .001, ƞ² = .397]. As illustrated in Figure 
3.4, it is evident that there is a decrease in RTs as delay increases. Follow up t-
test comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed significantly longer RTs at 
500ms (M= 893.4, sd= 264.5) compared to 5000ms (M= 699.3, sd= 282.4, 
pbonf=.002). There was no main effect of the cue [F (1, 11) = .172, p = .686, ƞ² = 
.015]. The interaction between cue and delay fell slightly short of the 
conventional significance level [F (3, 33) = 2.721, p= .060, ƞ² = .198]. Although 
the interaction cannot be considered significant, I explored it to understand 
better if there was any sign of cue facilitation. Post hoc t-test with Bonferroni 
correction showed that at a 500ms delay there is a difference between the cued 
and uncued trials, with uncued trials having faster reaction times (mean= 847.8, 




Figure 3.4.  The interaction between cue and delay on mean RTs (ms). At 500ms delay RTs tend 
to be slower in the cued than in the uncued condition. Bars are SEM 
 
Results on RTs do not indicate any facilitation of the cue except in the encoding 
phase (500ms). Overall, results from this experiment again do not support the 
hypothesis that subliminal cue was held in WM in order to perform a task, thus 
supporting the conclusion that the lack of effects in previous experiments was 
not due to the use of CFS as a masking technique.  
One further explanation of the negative results throughout these experiments 
could be the absence of reinforcement following the prime. It has been 
demonstrated that top-down modulation can affect the strength of subliminal 
priming, regardless of the cue saliency (Ansorge, Horstmann, & Worschech, 
2010). To address this possibility, I ran a further experiment providing feedback 
on the choice after each trial, in order to reinforce the choices in which 
participants were following the cue.  
108 
 
3.4  Experiment 8 - Backward Masking with feedback  
A growing number of studies on non-conscious processing demonstrates that 
the strength of subliminal priming is modulated by top-down mechanisms like 
motivation and task relevance of the cue (van Gaal, de Lange, & Cohen, 2012). 
Ansorge et al. (2010), for instance, found an attentional ERP marker during the 
subliminal presentation of a relevant cue in a visual search task, but the same 
marker was absent when participants were asked to locate the same subliminal 
colour cue without any feedback. According to the authors, the impossibility of 
tracking their own performance and the absence of reinforcement lead 
participants to abandon their goal in the location task (Ansorge et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Mealor and Dienes (2013) found an accuracy decrease in unconscious 
structural knowledge during artificial grammar learning when no explicit 
feedback was provided.  
To understand whether the absence of any feedback weakened the saliency of 
the subliminal cue in the present task, I ran a further experiment, identical to 
the previous one with the exception that feedback on the choice 
(correct/incorrect) was provided after each trial. In this way, participants could 
track their performance and the cue might assume a stronger predictive 
validity.   
3.4.1 Participants and procedure 
19 healthy participants (4 males, mean age= 23) took part in the experiment for 
course credit or £7. They had normal or corrected to normal vision, and signed 
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the consent form. Colour vision was assessed by asking to identify 4/4 tables of 
the Dvorine Colour Test correctly. The procedure was the same as in the 
previous experiment, with the exception that feedback was shown immediately 
after each participant’s answer for 500 ms: “Correct!” if they picked the right 
card; “Incorrect!” if they picked a card different from the cued one. The same 
feedback was also provided in the control experiment, run after the main one to 
identify participants showing awareness of the cue.  
3.4.2 Results 
 Control experiment 
A binomial analysis sorted by subjects was performed to compare individual 
performance with chance (25%). None of the participants showed significantly 
above chance performance. Still, three participants were excluded from data 
analyses because they failed to follow the instructions: rather than trying to 
guess, they selected the same answer on every trial. 
Mean confidence ratings on cue-congruent (M= 1.26, sd= .38) and cue-
incongruent responses (M= 1.27, sd= .39) were then compared by a t-test and 
showed no significant difference [t (15) = -0.45, p= .65], with 26% cue-
congruent answers (sd= .02). So participants’ awareness rating was not 
different for correct and incorrect choices, confirming that they were guessing. 
As in the previous experiments, I ran a Bayesian binomial analysis with a flat 
prior to check how strongly the data supported the null hypothesis (chance 
performance) with respect to the alternative hypothesis. I found a strong 
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evidence for H0 (BF01 = 19.056), thus confirming that stimuli were properly 
suppressed from awareness. 
 Main experiment 
Trials with reaction time higher than 2500ms and lower than 200ms (Whelan, 
2008) were excluded from analysis (6.3% of the trials, mean per participant = 
19, sd = 18.3, median = 10 [range 3, 59]). 
A one-way ANOVA with delay as a within subject factor performed on the mean 
accuracy showed no significant effect [F (3, 42) = .413, p = .745 ƞ² = .125]. 
Binomial analysis sorted by delays again showed that performance was not 
different from chance (Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5. Percentage of cue-congruent answers for each delay, the red dotted line indicates 




As classical analyses did not allow rejection of the null hypothesis (that 
performance was no different from chance), I ran Bayesian analyses to test the 
likelihood of the null hypothesis to be true. Bayesian binomials sorted by delays 
with a flat uninformative prior supported the null hypothesis over the 
alternative at each delay [500ms (BF01 = 27.397); 1000ms (BF01= 28.417); 
2000ms (BF01= 46.746); 5000ms (BF01= 8.295)]. 
Reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subject factors. Results 
showed a main effect of delay [F (3, 42) = 17.602, p = .000, ƞ² = .973]. Pairwise t 
tests with Bonferroni correction showed significantly longer RTs at 500ms 
(M=803.5, sd= 228.7) compared to 1000 (M= 722.4, sd= 269), to 2000ms (M= 
642, sd= 206) and to 5000ms (M= 577.7, sd= 142.2); p>.05. There was no 
significant effect of the cue [F (1, 14) = .177, p = .680, ƞ² = .068] or interaction 
between cue and delay [F (3, 42) = 1.162, p = .336, ƞ² = .290] 
 
From these results, it appears that participants could not rely on implicit WM 
maintenance even if reinforcement was given trial by trial through feedback on 
their performance. Moreover, the priming effect on RTs found at 500ms in the 
previous experiment did not replicate here. 
One more possibility is that implicit activation of WM is linked only to semantic 
retrieval, as in the case of Hassin (2009), where implicit WM activation was 
related to well-known geometrical patterns. In a series of studies, Della Sala et 
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al. (2010) also demonstrated that processing of semantic material from long-
term memory can take place implicitly, but this does not happen for unfamiliar 
objects. If this is the case, then the stimuli used in the experiments so far cannot 
elicit such implicit activation, as the position of a red card among other cards 
cannot be considered to trigger any semantic representation, and well-known 
objects would be needed.  
To test this possibility, I adapted the paradigm to subliminally cue participants 
with stimuli belonging to long-term memory representation, and assessed if 
such cuing would bias participants responses in a delayed choice. 
3.5  Experiment 9 - Exploring Semantic Priming Experiment  
The implicit activation of WM has been so far reported only in relation to stimuli 
represented in long-term memory/semantic memory. Della Sala et al. (2010) 
asked British brain-damaged patients with left-sided unilateral spatial neglect 
to listen to and read lists of four proverbs. The proverbs could be familiar 
(British) or unfamiliar (foreign) and were shown alongside a picture depicting 
one of the proverbs. Patients’ recognition of the proverb matching the picture 
was above chance, even if the key objects of the proverbs were depicted on the 
left neglected side of their visual field. Crucially, this was true only for familiar 
but not unfamiliar proverbs. Similar results were obtained with healthy 
participants, using subliminal presentation of one half of each picture. As the 
facilitation obtained from the subliminal features of the pictures concerned only 
familiar proverbs, the authors interpreted the results consistent with direct 
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activation of semantic memory from perception without intermediate stages of 
processing in working memory.  
Thus, it could be the case that the results by Hassin (2009), demonstrating a 
facilitation in perceptual judgment when stimuli presentation order followed a 
familiar pattern, are not due to WM activation without explicit intention, as the 
authors suggested, but to a long-term memory activation similar to the 
interpretation by Della Sala et al. (2010). Conversely, it is possible that results 
by Della Sala et al. (2010) are due to an activated representation from LTM that 
was held present within implicit WM during each trial. 
In the previous studies, I tried to assess the presence of an implicit 
representation in WM with a non- meaningful and subliminal spatial 
configuration, and results did not support the hypothesis. 
To test if implicit WM activation is limited to semantic material, I carried out a 
study with different materials, where the choice demanded a semantic 
association. If implicit WM activation is triggered only by semantic material 
(Della Sala et al., 2010), then priming participants with common objects should 
bias their choice toward the item sharing the characteristic of the primed object.  
To test this hypothesis, I adapted the guessing game: as cue, I used line drawn 
pictures of objects commonly associated with a particular colour (e.g., the sun is 
yellow), and then showed response options consisting of four coloured cards. I 
hypothesised that this semantic priming would lead participants to choose the 
card of that particular colour (e.g. a yellow card after being primed with the 
sun) among cards of other colours unrelated to the primed object. 
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3.5.1  Stimuli  
Stimuli consisted of five line drawing pictures, four of which represented 
objects commonly associated with a specific colour and one picture without any 
strong colour association. For the purpose, I selected the pictures of a heart 
(generally associated with red), a sun (yellow), a snowman (white), and a clover 
(green) as colour-cue stimuli; a house or a jumper were selected to be used as a 
control. All the stimuli were selected from the validated database by Snodgrass 
and Vanderwart (1980), apart from the clover, belonging to the database by 
Bonin, Peereman, Malardier, Méot, & Chalard (2003).  
All pictures background was turned to grey to match the experimental set-up, 
and dimension was modified to fit the same visual angle of 5°x7°. To test the 
strength of such colour association, I ran a pilot study in which 12 volunteers 
(mean age=28, males=3) were asked to associate each of the stimuli with a 
colour and to rate how strong was the association (see table 3.1). Agreement 
scores confirmed the strong association for the colour stimuli, while the jumper 
was found to be a better control than the house, as the latter turned out to be 
associated with red.   






Table 3.1 . Results from the pilot questionnaire. In the first column there are the responses 
to the question “what is the colour you associate this object with?”, in the second column the 
frequency of the answers. The third column shows the strength of the association between the 
indicated colour and the stimulus and the frequency of the answer. The strongest associations 
are in bold. 
 
3.5.2  Participants and Procedure  
Eighteen healthy participants (4 males, mean age= 20) took part in the 
experiment for course credit or £7. They had normal or corrected to normal 
vision, and signed the consent form. Colour vision was assessed by asking to 
correctly identify 4/4 tables of the Dvorine Colour Test. One participant did not 
follow the instruction and was excluded from data analysis (he always picked 
the same colour). 
Participants sat with their head on the chin – rest and were instructed to 
perform a guessing game: they were going to see a pattern of dots, a fixation 
cross and four cards of different colours arranged in a cross shape. There was a 
winning colour every round, and participants were asked to choose the card of 
the winning colour by using the arrow keys on the keyboard. The experiment 
started after eight practice trials. Each trial started with a 500ms fixation cross, 
then the prime was presented for 2 frames (24ms) in the centre of the screen, 
then the mask appeared for 8 frames (100ms). The mask was followed by a 
variable delay period of 500, 1000, 2000 or 5000 milliseconds, during which 
only a fixation cross was displayed. Then the response-stimulus, representing 
the four coloured cards (yellow, red, green and white) was presented until the 
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subject’s response (Figure 3.6). The locations of the cards were randomised. 
Each stimulus was presented 15 times at the 4 different delays, for a total of 300 
trials. Trial presentation order was randomised. Choices and reaction times 
were collected. 
As in the previous experiments, after the main experiment participants were 
asked to perform a control experiment, to exclude participants showing 
perceptual awareness of the cue. The control experiment resembled the main 
experiment, with the exception that: the interval between cue presentation and 
response stimulus was always 500 ms, participants were asked to attend the 
cue, a subjective measure of the cue visibility was required after each trial on a 
4-point PAS scale. Participants were informed that images of common objects 
were going to appear very briefly before the b/w pattern, and they were asked 
to pick the card of the colour they associate with the object. After the choice, 
they were asked to rate how well they saw the picture (1 - nothing, 4- well). 
Each stimulus was presented 60 times for a total of 300 trials. Trials 







Figure 3.6. Typical trial sequence: images were presented in the middle of the screen. Each 
trial begins with a 500 ms fixation cross, then the subliminal cue appeared for 24ms 
immediately followed by a mask for 100ms. After a delay of either 500, 1000, 2000, or 5000 ms 
in which the fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen, participants were presented 
with four cards of different colours (colour was randomly assigned to each position in each trial) 
and asked to pick the winning card by pressing the correspondent arrow key. 
 
3.5.3 Results 
 Control experiment 
A binomial analysis sorted by subjects was performed. Three participants 
showed a performance significantly different from chance (proportion of 
accuracy: 34%, 32%, 19%) were excluded from data analyses. 
Mean confidence on cue-congruent (M= 1.93, sd= .09)  and cue-incongruent 
responses (M= 1.93, sd= .10) were then compared by a t-test showing no 
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significant difference [t (13) = 1.77, p= .38].  So stimuli were properly 
suppressed from awareness. As in the previous experiments, a Bayesian 
binomial analysis with a flat prior on the mean proportion of correct (mean = 
0.24, sd = .01) showed a very strong evidence for the hypothesis that it was not 
different from chance level (0.25, BF01 = 46.043) 
 Main experiment 
Trials with reaction time higher than 2500ms and lower than 200ms (Whelan, 
2008) were excluded from analysis (3.19% of the trials, mean per participant = 
7.4, sd = 12.4, median = 2 [range 0, 42]). 
A repeated measures one-way ANOVA of delay performed on the mean accuracy 
showed no significant effect [F (3, 39) = .702, p = .557 ƞ² = .185]. 
Binomial analysis sorted by delays again showed that performance was not 




Figure 3.7. Percentage of cue-congruent answers for each delay, the red dotted line represents 
the chance level (25%). Performance does not differ from chance. Bars are SEM.  
 
A Bayesian binomial sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior showed 
very strong evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative at each delay 
[500ms (BF01 = 57.493); 1000ms (BF01= 74.658); 2000ms (BF01= 18.464); 
5000ms (BF01= 27.670)].  
Reaction times on cue-congruent responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subject factors. Results 
showed a main effect of delay [F (3, 39) = 5.245, p=.004, ƞ² = .901]. Post hoc t-
test with Bonferroni correction showed significantly longer RTs at 500ms (M= 
779.2, sd= 214.2) compared to 2000ms (M= 675.9, sd= 203.2, p=.02, Figure 3.8). 
The Cue effect was not significant [F (1, 13) = 3.544, p = .082, ƞ² = .214], nor was 
the interaction between cue and delay [F (3, 39) = 1.970, p = .144, ƞ² = .128]. 
 




Again, results do not support the hypothesis of an implicit WM activation with 
subliminal stimuli. 
3.6 Conclusions 
After a series of 6 experiments described in the previous chapter, exploring the 
implicit WM activation with stimuli masked by CFS and leading to weak and 
inconclusive results, in this chapter I presented three further experiments that 
aimed to investigate the same question by facing some possible methodological 
issues: first, would another masking technique give more robust results? 
Second, could the weakness of the effects found be linked to insufficient 
motivation? Third, could implicit WM activation be related only to semantic 
information retrieval?  
In the first experiment of the chapter I addressed the issue of the masking 
method, as differences in subliminal processing have been reported under CFS 
and BM (e.g., Dubois & Faivre, 2014). However, even by using BM instead of CFS 
we could not find any facilitation of the subliminal cue on performance. It is 
worth noting that, compared to CFS studies reported in the previous chapter, 
there was very little evidence of possible break-through of the suppressed cues 
into awareness in the control experiments: the number of participants excluded 
from main data analyses on the basis of their performance in the perceptual 
task was much lower than the number of participants excluded with CFS. 
Nevertheless, in the first BM experiment, there was evidence of a priming effect 
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on RTs at early delay (500 ms) expressed by longer time to process cued trials 
than uncued trials. No effect was found at longer WM delays. This could be 
interpreted as a demonstration of BM being a stronger way to suppress priming 
stimuli from awareness, but any comment would be speculative and beyond the 
scope of the current investigation, also considering that such a priming effect 
did not replicate in the other BM experiments.  
In the second BM experiment, participants were given feedback after each trial, 
to examine the possibility that motivational factors might modulate the results, 
given the absence of any reinforcement and the inability for participants to 
track their performance in the previous experiments. Even with this 
manipulation, the subliminal cue did not bias participants’ choices, and they 
performed at chance. 
The third BM experiment assessed the possibility of implicit WM activation with 
the semantic material, measuring whether a subliminally presented everyday 
object would bias participants’ choice toward the card sharing that object’s 
typical colour. Implicit activation of WM has been reported, in fact, in relation to 
semantic retrieval, as in the case of Hassin (2009) with familiar geometrical 
patterns, or Della Sala et al. (2010) with familiar but not with unfamiliar objects. 
Nevertheless, here I found no effect of a well-known subliminally presented 
object on subsequent choices. 
In summary, the present paradigm failed to demonstrate the existence of 
implicit activation in WM with subliminal stimuli, although in 9 experiments I 
used different stimuli characteristics and meaning, masks and masking 
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techniques. It remains possible that subliminal stimuli require explicit 
instruction to be retained in WM, as Soto speculatively suggested (Soto & 
Silvanto, 2014) and that the WM activation without conscious intention (Hassin, 
2009) only happens with visible stimuli.  
To try to answer these questions, I ran a further series of experiments, with a 
more similar approach to the previous literature. In these experiments, I 
performed conceptual and exact replications of the main experiments 





4.1  Introduction 
Based on recent evidence that WM can retain subliminal stimuli (Soto et al., 
2011, Bergstrom et al., 2015), and that WM can also be activated without 
conscious intentions (Hassin, 2009) I built a paradigm aimed to assess whether 
WM can be implicitly activated by subliminal stimuli in order to perform a 
simple task. A total of nine experiments, using different masking techniques, 
stimuli and manipulations, did not show any relevant effect.  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, finding no facilitation of a subliminal cue 
in a delayed choice could mean that even if WM may process non-conscious 
stimuli, this processing might require explicit instructions to take place. The 
idea that some awareness might be required for WM to be activated has been 
suggested by Soto and Silvanto (2014). This claim refers to a study by Pan, Lin, 
Zhao, & Soto (2013), demonstrating that stimuli matching the content of WM, 
and masked through CFS, broke into awareness faster than other stimuli. 
Crucially, this was true even when the stimulus held in WM was masked, but 
only if participants were instructed to hold the subliminal stimulus in memory. 
The conclusion by Soto and Silvanto (2014) is speculative, as it draws on a 
paradigm in which no visible context was given (subliminal cue and subliminal 
target) and whose primary aim was to investigate the role of WM in biasing 
visual attention. This notwithstanding, the need for explicit instruction as the 
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reason for experiments to demonstrate implicit WM activation with a subliminal 
cue is intriguing. Therefore, I performed a series of replications of the study by 
Soto (2011). Finding a same pattern of results would be a basis for defining the 
conditions for implicit WM activation, which has been investigated rarely in the 
literature.  
For this purpose, I ran some conceptual replications, i.e. adapting my paradigm 
to previous studies’ experimental conditions; and some exact replications, by 
strictly following the original paper by Soto et al. (2011). The reason why there 
are several exact replications reported here is that, following some 
methodological issues that emerged during the first replication attempt, further 
adjustments have been suggested by the original authors from whom I sought 
advice. These will be detailed below. 
4.2   Conceptual replications 
In order to understand if the lack of effect throughout the 10 experiments 
described in Chapter 2 and 3 was due to the need of giving explicit instruction to 
allow WM retention of subliminal stimuli, I ran an experiment with similar 
conditions and instructions as those used by Soto (2011). His first study 
demonstrated maintenance of subliminal stimuli in WM. Soto maintained that 
WM might require conscious intention to be activated (Soto & Silvanto, 2014). 
Accordingly, I tested the subliminal maintenance of stimuli when participants 
were explicitly instructed to do so. Also, in a further experiment, I tested 
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whether some exposure to visible cues is required to allow subliminal cues to be 
processed.  
Bergstrom et al. (2015), in a delayed match-to-sample task employing stimuli 
masked by CFS, alternated visible and invisible cues to be retained in WM. Soto 
et al. (2011) also used visible and invisible cues during the practice session of 
their experiment, which consisted of 48 trials. The importance of a visible 
context for subliminal priming has been actually pointed out in literature. Gayet 
et al. (2014), for instance, found a cueing effect of subliminal arrows only when 
they were intermixed with visible arrow cues, concluding that a visible context 
is needed for subliminal priming to occur. I ran two conceptual replications: in 
the first one, participants were explicitly instructed to attend to the red card, 
even if they could not consciously perceive it - thus replicating Soto et al.’s 
(2011) instructions; in the second replication, along with explicit instructions, 
visible and invisible cues were alternated in the task.   
4.2.1 Experiment 10 - Explicit instruction 
In the first conceptual replication, I asked participants to keep in mind the 
position of the red card even if they could not consciously perceive it, mimicking 
Soto et al.’s (2011) instructions. Similar to Soto et al. (2011), an awareness 
rating on the cue visibility was required after each trial on a 4-point PAS scale. 
The paradigm was similar to that reported by Soto (see Fig 4.5), insofar as 
participants were instructed to retain a subliminal cue in mind, but stimuli and 
presentation times were the same as used in my previous experiments. 
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4.2.1.1 Stimuli  
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in the first backward masking 
experiment (Experiment 7).  
4.2.1.2  Participants and procedure 
A total of 10 healthy participants (1 male, mean age= 20.5 ) were recruited from 
the University of Edinburgh students. They had normal or corrected to normal 
vision (colour vision was assessed through Dvorine Colour tables), and took 
part in the experiment for course credit or £7. 
Participants sat with the head on the chin – rest and were presented with 
instructions. They were informed that they would be presented very briefly 
with a picture of four cards, one of which was red, followed by a pattern of 
colours, a fixation cross and four cards. They were asked to try keeping in mind 
the position of the red card, even if they could not see it, and indicate it by using 
the arrow keys of the keyboard. After each choice, they would be asked to rate 
how well they saw the red card. The experiment started after eight practice 
trials. 
Trial sequence was the same as the backward masking experiment (Experiment 
7), with the exception that PAS ratings were collected after each trial instead of 
running a control experiment, and only trials with a confidence rating of 1 (‘I 
have seen nothing') were analysed (akin to Soto et al., 2011). Each stimulus was 
presented 12 times for each of the 4 different delays, for a total of 240 trials. 
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Trial order was randomised. The frequency of choice and reaction times were 
collected. 
4.2.1.3 Results  
Trials with reaction time higher than 2500ms and lower than 200ms were 
excluded from analysis (4.4% of trials, mean per participant = 18.5, sd = 13.4, 
median = 15 [range 5; 40]). After Soto et al. (2011), only trials receiving a PAS 
rating of ‘nothing’ (71% of the trials, considering only the cue-present ones) 





Figure 4.1.  (a) Mean number of trials for each rating in the cued and uncued condition. The 
cued trials were mostly rated as ‘nothing’ (71%), showing a good cue suppression. (b) 
Percentage of accuracy for the different ratings (on cued trials). The red dotted line represents 
the chance level (25%). Bars are SEM. 
 
A one way repeated measures ANOVA with delay as within-subject factor 
performed on the mean accuracy of trials rated as 1 showed no significant effect 
[F(3, 27) = .552, p = .651 ƞ² = .058]. I performed a binomial analysis sorted by 
delays only on trials with a confidence rating of 1. Results showed that 
performance was at chance at each delay (Figure 4.2), thus failing to replicate 
with our stimuli results from previous studies on WM maintenance of 
subliminal stimuli, showing an above chance performance in delayed choice 
tasks with subliminal to-be-remembered cue (e.g. Soto et al. 2011, Bergstrom et 




Figure 4.2. Percentage of correct answers for each delay in the trials rated as “nothing”. The red 
dotted line represents the chance level (25%), bars are SEM 
 
A Bayesian binomial test sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior was 
run to compare the probability that the accuracy was at chance with the 
probability that it was higher than chance. Results showed strong evidence for 
the null hypothesis over the alternative at each delay [500ms (BF01 = 
18.186);1000ms (BF01= 30.249); 2000ms (BF01= 31.555) 5000 ms (BF01= 
30.822)]. 
In order to verify a possible facilitation of the subliminal cue on reaction times, 
reaction times on cued correct responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within-subjects factors. Results 
showed no significant main effect of the delay [F (3, 27) = .217, p=.884, ƞ² = 
.086] or of the cue [F (1, 9) = 0.18, p = .897, ƞ² = .052] as well as the interaction 




Figure 4.3 The interaction between cue and delay on mean RTs (ms). Bars are SEM 
 
 
In contrast with previous experiments, where analyses on RTs consistently 
showed an effect of the delay with responses getting faster at longer delays, 
here such effect is absent. This difference is likely to be due to higher data 
variability considering the small sample, as is evident from the error bars in 
figure 4.3. 
Overall, results from this experiment reinforce results from my previous 
experiments in providing no evidence for WM retention of stimuli of which the 
participant is unaware, despite in the present experiment explicitly instructing. 
In a further conceptual replication, visible and invisible cue were alternated, 




4.2.2 Experiment 11 - Explicit instruction with visible trials  
Instructing participants to attend to the subliminal memory cues did not help 
them in retaining such cues in working memory. One other manipulation used 
in studies on WM maintenance of subliminal stimuli is the alternation of visible 
and invisible trials.  
Bergstrom et al. (2015) alternated three visibility conditions (visible, invisible, 
and absent) in a delayed match to sample task that aimed to investigate WM 
maintenance of subliminal stimuli. Similarly, Soto (2011) alternated visible and 
invisible cues during a relatively long practice session (48 trials).  
There is some evidence that this manipulation can have an impact on 
subsequent performance: there are studies showing that subliminal cues bias 
participants' performance only if they are intermixed with  visible predictive 
cues, whereas non-predictive visible cues (not matching the position of the 
following target) lead participants to ignore invisible predictive cues. Reuss, 
Pohl, Kiesel, & Kunde (2011), presented participants with visible and invisible 
arrow cues. In one experiment only 50% of the arrows (both visible and 
invisible) were actually predictive of the target position, while in a second 
experiment cue validity was raised to 80%. Visible arrows were found to bias 
attention in both experiments, while invisible arrows biased participants' 
attention only with higher cue validity.  
In a similar paradigm, Gayet et al., (2014), confirmed that visible nonpredictive 
arrow cues lead participants to elude predictive masked arrows, concluding that 
subliminal cues require a visible predictive cue to be detected. 
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For this reason, in the following conceptual replication, I presented participants 
with visible and invisible cues. 
4.2.2.1 Stimuli 
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in the previous experiment.  
4.2.2.2  Participants and procedure  
Seventeen healthy participants were recruited from the University of Edinburgh 
students (mean age= 21.15, 10 males) for course credits or £7. They had normal 
or corrected to normal vision and their colour vision was assessed through 
Dvorine Colour tables (4/4 correct). 
Participants sat with their head on the chin – rest and were presented with 
instruction. They were informed that a picture of four cards, one of which was 
red, would be presented very briefly, followed by a pattern of colours, a fixation 
cross and a picture of four blue cards. They were asked to try to keep in mind 
the position of the red card, even if they could not always see it clearly, and 
indicate it by using the arrow keys of the keyboard. After each choice, they 
would be asked to rate how well they saw the red card. The experiment started 
after eight practice trials.  
The trial sequence was the same of the previous experiment (experiment 8), but 
the cue was presented at two different presentation times: 2 frames (24 ms) for 
the subliminal condition and 10 frames (120 ms) for the visible condition. Each 
stimulus was presented 15 times at the 4 different delays and 2 visibility 
conditions, for a total of 600 trials. Trial presentation order was randomised. 
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Choices and reaction times were collected. Only trials with a confidence rating 
of 1 (‘I have seen nothing') were analysed (Soto et al., 2011). 
4.2.2.3 Results 
Trials with reaction times higher than 2500 ms and lower than 200ms (see 
Whelan, 2008) were excluded from analysis (5.9% of trials; mean per 
participant = 34.4, sd = 27.4, median = 30.5 [range 7, 89]). 40% of the answers 
on cued trials were rated as “nothing”, 96% of these belonging to the subliminal 
condition (2 frames presentation time, see Fig. 4.4 a and b). 
Considering the subliminal condition specifically, 79% of the cued trials were 







Figure 4.4. a) proportion of trials rating in the visible and invisible condition 78% of the trials 
in the subliminal condition (PT = 2 frames) were rated as nothing. b) percentage of accuracy in 
the invisible and visible conditions sorted by ratings. Bars are SEM 
 
A one way ANOVA with delay as within subject factor performed on the mean 
accuracy showed no significant effect [F(3, 51) = .191, p = .902, ƞ² = .011]. 
I performed a binomial analysis sorted by delays only on trials with a 
confidence rating of 1 in the subliminal condition (39% of the total cued trials). 
Results showed that performance was at chance at each delay (Figure 4.5), thus 
failing once again to replicate results from previous studies on WM maintenance 






Figure 4.5. Percentage of correct answers for each delay in the trials rated as 1 (I have seen 
nothing) in the invisible condition. The red dotted line represents the chance level. Bars are 
SEM. 
 
A Bayesian binomial sorted by delays with a flat uninformative prior to compare 
the probability that the accuracy was at chance with the probability that it was 
higher than chance showed strong evidence for the null hypothesis over the 
alternative at each delay [500ms (BF01 = 19.435); 1000ms (BF01= 26.457); 
2000ms (BF01= 44.906); 5000 ms (BF01= 33.915)]. 
Reaction times on cued correct responses vs responses in uncued trials were 
analysed through a repeated measures 4 x 2 ANOVA with delay (500, 1000, 
2000, 5000 ms) and cue (present, absent) as within subjects factors. Results 
showed a main effect of delay [F (3, 51) = 5.590, p = .002, ƞ² = .247]. Post hoc 
comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that RTs were significantly 
longer at 500ms (M= 756.79 sd= 236.09) than 1000 ms (M= 639.99, sd= 177 p= 
.01), 2000 ms (M=600.72, sd= 177.15 p=.01) and 5000 ms(M= 574.62, sd= 
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182.82, p= .004, see figure 4.7). The effect of the cue was not significant [F (1, 
17) =1.240, p = .281,  ƞ² = .068] and neither was the interaction between cue 
and delay [F (3, 51) = 0.551, p = .650, ƞ² = .031, Figure 4.6] 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean RTs across delays on correct cued vs uncued trials, bars are SEM 
 
4.3  Exact replications 
In his 2011 paper, Soto et al. concluded that WM is not restricted to consciously 
perceived stimuli by demonstrating that stimuli of which participants are not 
aware can be retained for more than 2 seconds. After them, other studies using 
different manipulations seemed to confirm the same idea (Eriksson, Bergström, 
& Eriksson, 2015; King, Pescetelli, & Dehaene, 2016; Trübutschek et al., 2017). 
Bergstrom et al. (2015) demonstrated that participants could retain stimuli 
masked by CFS for 15 seconds to perform a delayed match to sample task. 
Similarly, Trübutschek et al. (2017), found that participants could successfully 
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recognise the location of a stimulus masked through BM after a delay of 4s, 
despite the presence of visible distractors or conscious WM load. The study by 
King et al. (2016) is the closest one to Soto's study in terms of stimuli and 
results, but the retention interval was much briefer (800 ms) and performance 
in the unseen trial was "weakly but significantly above chance" to use the 
author's worlds (p. 1124). 
Although all these experiments seem to confirm the results by Soto et al. (2011) 
with different experimental paradigms, I couldn't find any evidence of WM 
maintenance of subliminal stimuli in my own experiments, neither with implicit 
or explicit instruction. So, finally, I decided to replicate the exact experiment by 
Soto et al. (2011).  
The importance of exact replications has been pointed out extensively, 
especially with regard to unconscious cognition studies (see Shanks, 2016).  
As already mentioned, Shanks (2016) recently demonstrated that some of the 
statistically significant results reported in unconscious cognition studies, 
commonly using a post-hoc data selection, might be explained by the statistical 
phenomenon of regression to the mean. As explained in Chapter 2, this refers to 
the mathematical necessity that participants with extremely low or high score 
on one measure will get closer to the group’s mean score on another measure 
(Shanks, 2016), in this case performance in the main task and in the perceptual 
judgment.  
Also, Stein et al. (2016) noted that in Soto's paper the analyses to measure the 
participants' awareness of the cue (i.e., the d') were carried out in a way that is 
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susceptible to bias. The sensitivity index (d'), is a measure derived from signal 
detection theory and quantifies the ability to discriminate the signal from the 
noise. It is calculated on the ratio of hits (reporting that there is the signal when 
the signal is actually present) and false alarms (reporting that there is the signal 
when the signal is absent). A d' of zero means that there is no distance between 
the two distributions of hits and false alarms, i.e. participants are unable to 
discriminate the signal from the noise. 
Following these criticisms, in replicating the study I ran some additional 
analyses: along with t-test against chance on the accuracy on the trials rated as 
invisible (replicating the previous study analyses), I ran Bayesian analyses. After 
Shanks (2016), in case of positive results I would have performed a further 
analysis examining odd- and even-numbered trials separately, to control for the 
possibility that results are biased by the effect of regression to the mean.  
Replicating the experiment would contribute to the debate in the literature: 
finding the same effect, on a larger sample and supported also by Bayesian 
analyses (using Soto et al.'s 2011 effect size as the prior), would firmly support 
Soto's claim that non-conscious processing is more elaborate than previously 
supposed, but it might as well be related to some specific experimental 
conditions. Conversely, a failure to replicate the results would support the idea 
that experiments on non-conscious processing need stricter criteria and control 
before interpretation, and there is still not enough evidence to challenge the link 
between WM and consciousness (Stein et al., 2016). 
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4.3.1 Experiment 12 - Exact replication 1 
The first exact replication attempt followed all the parameters of the original 
paper. Where some more information was required, we contacted the authors 
asking for clarification. The authors also provided us with their participants' 
mean performance score to be used as prior for the Bayesian analyses. 
4.3.1.1 Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a DELL Latitude P991 laptop running Windows 7 
Professional with a Nvidia GeForce GT 610 graphics device and an 18'' 
Mitsubishi colour display set on 800 x 600 px resolution at 60 Hz refresh rate, in 
order to match the original study's set-up. 
Participants’ head was stabilised by a chin-rest placed at a viewing distance of 
57 cm. The experiment was implemented on PsychoPy2, whereas the original 
study was run on Eprime, due to the former having a better timing for a brief 
presentation of visual stimuli (Garaizar et al., 2014). 
4.3.1.2  Stimuli 
 
Stimuli were generated on Psychopy following the parameters of the original 
paper. They consisted of Gabor patches with a spatial frequency of 1 cycle/deg 
and a diameter of 3.8 deg of visual angle from a viewing distance of 57 cm. They 
could be tilted 10 deg, 40 deg, 70 deg, 100 deg, 130 deg and 160 deg clockwise 
from the vertical. The background was grey with luminance of 20.54 cd/m2 
(original paper: 19.75 cd/m2). The luminance of the Gabors was 22.19 cd/m2 
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(original paper: 22.25 cd/m2). The experiment took place in a fully illuminated 
room (personal communication with Soto, December 2017). 
4.3.1.3 Participants and Procedure 
To have an 80% probability of detecting an effect as low as 1/3 of the original 
effect size, Simonsohn (2015) shows that the sample should be 2.5 times the 
original report's size. So I tripled the original sample size (7 participants) to 
meet this requirement. 22 healthy participants (7 males, mean age 18.7) were 
recruited from the University of Edinburgh students. They gave written consent 
and rewarded with course credit or £7. 
The procedure followed the original paper. Participants were presented with 
the instructions accompanied by examples of trials and the same disclaimer 
reported by the authors in the supplemental material, which instructed 
participants to attend and maintain the cue in memory even if they could not 
consciously perceive it. Each trial started with a black fixation point in the 
middle of the screen for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, then 
the memory cue appeared for 16.67 ms (1 frame). The cue was randomly 
selected and it was absent in 50% of the trials. A black circle (the mask) 
followed immediately for 100 ms. After a delay period of 2000ms, another 
Gabor appeared for 200 ms, tilted 30 degrees either to the left or right of the 
memory cue. Participants were asked to indicate whether the target Gabor was 
clockwise or anticlockwise oriented with respect to the memory cue, by 
pressing the left or right arrow key. They were then asked to rate how well they 
saw the memory cue on a 4 point scale (1 = nothing; 2 = glimpse; 3= something; 
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4 = well), selecting their choice with the arrow keys. Participants performed 2 
blocks of 48 trials, for a total of 96 trials (see Figure 4.7). 
Before the main experiment, participants performed two blocks of practice 
containing 24 trials each. In half of these trials the duration of the cue was 16.67 
ms, and 216.67 ms in the other half, in random order. There were no cue-absent 




Figure 4.7. Trial sequence. Each trial started with a black fixation point in the middle of the 
screen for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, then the memory cue appeared for 
16.67 ms (1 frame). The cue consisted in a Gabor patch tilted either 10, 40, 70, 100, 130 or 160 
deg to the right from the vertical (randomly selected). The cue was absent in 50% of the trials. A 
black circle (the mask) followed immediately for 100 ms. After a delay period of 2000ms, 
another Gabor appeared for 200 ms, tilted 30 degrees either to the left or right of the memory 
cue. Participants were asked to indicate whether the target Gabor was clockwise or 
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anticlockwise oriented with respect to the memory cue, by pressing the arrow keys. They were 
then asked to rate how well they saw the memory cue on a 4 point scale.   
 
4.3.1.4 Results 
First, I performed the same analyses as the original paper. I performed a t-test 
against chance (50%) on the average performance (mean = 0.51, sd = 0.28) on 
the trials rated as 1 (I have seen nothing). Results showed no significant 
difference from chance [t(21)= 0.27, p= 0.78, two-tailed, Figure 4.8].  
It must be noted that 55% of the total trials were given a rating of " seen 
nothing" in the PAS, 19% of the total trials were given a rating of "nothing" 
when the cue was present (see Fig. 4.9). This suggests that participants were 
mostly able to discriminate the presence of the memory cue, a possibility 
confirmed by signal detection analyses. The sensitivity measure was calculated 
using the probability of hits and false alarms. Hits were defined as the 
proportion of trials rated as 1(seen nothing) when the cue was absent over the 
total number of cue absent trials (meanPHits = 0.72, sd= 0.22). False alarms 
were defined as the proportion of trials rated as 1(seen nothing) when the cue 
was present, out of the total number of cue-present trials (meanPFA = 0.37, sd= 
0.35). A t-test revealed that, across participants, d' was significantly different 
from 0 [ t(21) = 8.07, p< .01, two tailed], with an average of 1.20 (sd = 0.69). 
This means that participants were able to distinguish the presence of the signal, 
and thus can't be assumed to have been unaware of the cue.  
144 
 
 I performed these analyses also with the Bayesian method. A Bayesian t-test 
comparing accuracy with chance (50%), using the distribution values of Soto's 
data as priors (mean performance=. 58, sd= .05), consistently supports the null 
hypothesis that performance was not significantly different from chance (BF01 
= 4.331). Participants' performance on trials rated as unconscious was not 
significantly different from chance. 
A Bayesian t-test on individual d' distribution confirmed that sensitivity index 
was different from 0, with extreme support for the alternative hypothesis (BF 
10=  207661.915). This indicates that participants were able to discriminate 
between the presence or the absence of the memory cue. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Proportion of correct responses for each rating in the cued condition. The red dotted 






Figure 4.9 Proportion of responses for each rating in the cued and uncued conditions. The 36% 
of the total number of trials was rated as nothing when no cue was actually presented (50% of 
the total trial number). Bars are SEM. 
 
4.3.2 Experiment 13 – Exact replication with a checkerboard mask 
The failure in achieving a good suppression with the stimuli resembling the 
original paper by Soto et al. (2011) was already clear from the debriefing of the 
first participants. For this reason, I programmed another identical experiment 
with a different mask, in order to obtain better suppression. 
 Considering the short duration of the exact replication experiment, I asked the 
participants to perform this second experiment after the main one (the exact 
replication reported in Experiment 12). The decision of no counterbalancing the 
order of presentation is based on the fact that the main goal was to replicate 
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Soto et al. (2011) as closely as possible, so I didn't want to interfere with the 
original procedure by adding an "experiment order" variable. 
4.3.2.1 Stimuli 
The stimulus set was the same as in the previous replication, with the exception 
of the black mask, which was substituted here by a radial checkerboard 
covering 3.8 deg of visual angle and consisting of 3 radial cycles and 4 angular 
cycles, with 0.5 radial phase, 0.1 Michelson contrast and a Gaussian mask. 
4.3.2.2 Participants and procedure 
Twelve participants took part in the experiment after running Experiment 12. 
The procedure was the same as in the previous experiment, including the 
practice trials (Figure 4.10). Participants were told they were going to see a 
checkerboard instead of the black circle, and to keep in mind the orientation of 





Figure 4.10. Trial sequence. The trial started with a black fixation point in the middle of the 
screen for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, then the memory cue appeared for 
16.67 ms (1 frame). The cue consisted in a Gabor patch tilted either 10, 40, 70, 100, 130 or 160 
deg to the right from the vertical (randomly selected). Cue was absent in 50% of the trials. A 
radial checkerboard (the mask) followed immediately for 100 ms. After a delay period of 
2000ms, another Gabor appeared for 200 ms, tilted 30 degrees either to the left or right of the 
memory cue. Participants were asked to indicate whether the target Gabor was clockwise or 
anticlockwise oriented with respect to the memory cue, by pressing the arrow keys. They were 
then asked to rate how well they saw the memory cue on a 4 point scale.    
 
4.3.2.3  Results 
The percentage of trials receiving a rating of 1 in the PAS (I have seen nothing) 
slightly increased, with 69% of the total number of trials rated as "nothing". The 
27% of the total number of trials was rated “nothing” when the cue was present 
(see Figure 4.11). So, although the checkerboard mask was more effective than 
the black circle, the suppression was still weak.  The sensitivity index calculated 
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on the probability of hits ( mean= 0.84 sd=0.15) and false alarms (mean=0.53 
sd=0.37) defined as described in the previous experiment. A t-test confirmed 
that the d' was significantly different from 0 [t (11) = 3.61, p< .01, two tailed], 
with an average d’ of 1.07 (sd = 1.02, table 4.2).  This indicates that participants’ 
discrimination was not at chance.  
Again, I performed a t-test against chance on the average performance 
(mean=0.54 sd=0.16) on the trials rated as 1. Results showed no significant 
difference from chance [50% t(11)= 0.95, p= 0.36, two-tailed, Figure 4.12]. 
 
Figure 4.11. The proportion of responses for each rating in the cued and uncued conditions. 









Figure 4.12   Proportion of correct responses for each rating in the cued condition. The red 
dotted line represents the chance level (50%), bars are SEM. 
 
I also performed these analyses with the Bayesian method. A Bayesian t-test 
comparing accuracy with chance (50%), still using the distribution values of 
Soto’s data as priors (mean performance= 0.58, sd=0.05) also showed support 
for the null hypothesis (BF01 = 1.701), although it can be considered anecdotal 
(Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). Participants’ performance on trials rated as 1 can be 
considered at chance.  
A Bayesian t-test on individual d' distribution also confirmed the classical 
analysis, with strong support for the alternative hypothesis (BF 10= 12.416) 
over the null, which means that sensitivity index was different from 0. This 
indicates that participants were likely able to discriminate between the 
presence or the absence of the memory cue. 
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4.3.3 Experiment 14 -Exact replication 3 (Authors’ exact instructions) 
After my failure to replicate the results by Soto et al. (2011), I contacted the 
authors to make sure that my replication had followed their original work 
precisely. I shared with them screenshots of the stimuli, the experiment code 
and the instructions. Although my stimuli followed the specifications in their 
paper, Soto and Silvanto (personal communication, December 2017) kindly 
pointed to some differences in the stimuli they actually used in the experiment 
(see stimuli section below). So, following their instructions, I programmed two 
more experiments: the first one has been confirmed to be an exact replication 
by the authors of the original paper; the second one follows Soto's suggestion to 
strengthen the suppression by using a noise pattern as a mask instead of a black 
circle.  
Once again, participants performed both the experiments in a specific order: 
exact replication first, followed by the experiment with the different mask. As 
before, my principal aim was to run an exact replication and this is why I did not 
counterbalance the experimental order. 
4.3.3.1 Stimuli 
 
Stimuli were generated on Psychopy following the parameters provided by the 
authors through correspondence (Soto, personal communication, November 
2017). There are some differences in the characteristics described in the 
original paper. The authors indicated that their stimuli were not Gabor patches 
but sinusoidal gratings with a spatial frequency of 0.1 cycles per pixel. All the 
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other parameters remained the same (3.8 deg of visual angle from a viewing 
distance of 57cm).  Authors confirmed that the stimuli set up in this way 
matched their own. 
4.3.3.2 Participants and Procedure 
Again, I tested 22 participants to have an 80% probability of detecting an effect 
as low as 1/3 of the original effect size (Simonsohn, 2015). Participants (4 
males, mean age= 18.9) were students of the University of Edinburgh who gave 
written consent and were rewarded with course credit or £7/hour.  
The procedure followed the original paper and was the same as the previous 
experiments (Figure 4.13). 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Trial sequence. The trial started with a black fixation point in the middle of the 
screen for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, then the memory cue appeared for 
16.67 ms (1 frame). The cue consisted of a grating tilted either 10, 40, 70, 100, 130 or 160 deg to 
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the right from the vertical (randomly selected). The cue was absent in 50% of the trials. A black 
circle (the mask) followed immediately for 100 ms. After a delay period of 2000ms, another 
grating appeared for 200 ms, tilted 30 degrees either to the left or right of the memory cue. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether the target grating was clockwise or anticlockwise 
oriented with respect to the memory cue, by pressing the arrow keys. They were then asked to 
rate how well they saw the memory cue on a 4 point scale.    
 
4.3.3.3 Results 
46% of the total number of trials was rated as “nothing”, with only 6% of the 
total number of trials rated as “nothing” when the cue was present (see figure 
4.14). So, although I modified the stimuli according to the authors' instruction, it 
seems that they were not properly suppressed. In order to measure the ability 
of participants to discriminate the presence of the cue, I calculated the 
sensitivity index. The proportion of trials rated as 1 when the cue was absent on 
the total number of cue absent trials was considered as "hits" (mean Phits= 
0.81, sd=0.24), and the proportion of trials rated as "nothing" when the cue was 
present as "false alarms"(mean Pfa= 0.11 sd=0.19). The sensitivity measure of d' 
was calculated on the individual probability of hits and false alarms. A t-test 
revealed that the d' was significantly different from 0 [ t(21) = 11.82, p< .01, two 
tailed], with an average of 2.75 (sd = 1.09). A Bayesian t-test on individual d' 
distribution confirmed that the sensitivity index was different from 0, with 
extreme support for the alternative hypothesis (BF 10= 196200000). This 
indicates that participants were able to discriminate between the presence or 
the absence of the memory cue.  
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I performed a t-test against chance (50%) on the average performance (mean= 
0.54, sd= 0.39) on the WM orientation discrimination task on the trials rated as 
1 (I have seen nothing). Results showed no significant difference from chance 
[t(21)= 0.51, p= 0.61, two-tailed, Figure 4.15].   
 
Figure 4.14  Proportion of responses for each rating in the cued and uncued conditions .40% of 





Figure 4.15  Proportion of correct responses for each rating in the cued condition. The red 
dotted line represents the chance level (50%), bars are SEM.   
 
 A Bayesian t-test comparing accuracy with chance (50%), using the distribution 
values of Soto's data as priors supports the null hypothesis (BF01 = 8.192) that 
participants' performance was at chance.   
4.3.4  Experiment 15 -  Exact replication 4 (Noise mask Experiment) 
After corresponding with Soto and Silvanto about my difficulties in masking 
stimuli with their parameters, they suggested me to use a different mask 
consisting of a dots noise pattern, which they were using in a current 





Stimuli were the same as the previous experiment, with the exception of the 
mask, consisting of a random noise pattern generated in Psychopy with a code 
provided by Soto (personal communication, December 2017) and resembling 
the noise mask described in Dalmaijer (2016) . The mask consisted of a grating 
of 3.8 degrees of visual angle whose texture consisted of a randomly generated 
pattern of black and white dots with a density of 128x128 pixels. 
4.3.4.2  Participants and Procedure  
 
All participants ran this experiment after completing the previous one, thus they 
were the same participants as in Experiment 14. The procedure was also the 





Figure 4.16. Trial sequence. The trial started with a black fixation point in the middle of the 
screen for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, then the memory cue appeared for 
16.67 ms (1 frame). The cue consisted of a grating tilted either 10, 40, 70, 100, 130 or 160 deg to 
the right from the vertical (randomly selected). The cue was absent in 50% of the trials. A dot-
noise pattern (the mask) followed immediately for 100 ms. After a delay period of 2000ms, 
another grating appeared for 200 ms, tilted 30 degrees either to the left or right of the memory 
cue. Participants were asked to indicate whether the target grating was clockwise or 
anticlockwise oriented with respect to the memory cue, by pressing the arrow keys. They were 





59% of the total number of trials were rated as "nothing", 23% of the total 
number of trials were rated as “nothing” when the cue was present (Figure 
4.17).  
The sensitivity index was calculated following the same procedure of the 
previous experiments, with the probability of hits scored as the ratio between 
the number of trials rated as “nothing” when the cue was absent and the total 
number of cue-absent trials (mean Phits= 0.73,sd= 0.31) and the probability of 
false alarms as the ratio between the number of trials receiving the rating of 
“nothing” when the cue was present and the total number of  cue-present trials 
(mean Pfa= 0.46, sd= 0.33).  A t-test was performed to assess whether d’ was 
reliably close to 0. Results revealed that the d' was significantly different from 0 
[ t(21) = 5.67, p< .01, two tailed], with an average of 1.04 (sd = 0.74).  
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A Bayesian t-test on individual d' distribution confirmed that the sensitivity 
index was different from 0, with extreme support for the alternative hypothesis 
(BF10= 1786.143). This indicates that participants were able to discriminate 
between the presence or the absence of the memory cue, which, again, was not 
suppressed. 
 
Figure 4.17 Proportion of responses for each rating in the cued and uncued conditions .36% of 
the total trial number was rated ‘nothing’ when the cue was absent (50% of the total trials). 
61% of the trials rated as nothing (59% of the total trial number) were trials in which no cue 
was actually presented. Bars are SEM. 
 
I still performed a t-test against chance (50%) on the average performance 
(mean= 0.50, sd= 0.15) on the trials rated as 1 (I have seen nothing). Results 
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showed no significant difference from chance [t(21)= - 0.77, p= 0.44, two-tailed, 
Figure 4.18].  
A Bayesian t-test comparing accuracy with chance (50%), using the distribution 
values of Soto's data as priors extremely supports the null hypothesis (BF01 = 
237.321) that performance on trials rated as 1 was at chance. 
 
 
Figure 4.18.  Mean accuracy as a function of rating in the cued condition. The red dotted line 
represents the chance level (50%). Bars are SEM. 
4.4 Discussion 
In the present chapter, I presented a series of conceptual and exact replications 
of the first study investigating the WM maintenance of stimuli suppressed from 
awareness (Soto et al., 2011). These replications were essential to clarify the 
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outcomes of the ten experiments described in the previous chapters and failing 
to demonstrate an implicit WM activation with subliminal stimuli.  
While the WM maintenance of subliminal stimuli seems to be encountered in 
different experimental situations (Bergstrom et al., 2015; King et al., 2016; 
Trübutschek et al., 2017)., the WM activation without being explicitly requested 
has been reported only once in literature, to the best of my knowledge (Hassin 
et al., 2009). So, it might have been the case that such an implicit activation 
needs specific conditions to happen, not fulfilled by the present paradigm. 
Before reaching such a conclusion, I tried to replicate previous findings of WM 
processing of subliminal stimuli. Two conceptual replications, using the same 
stimuli as my previous experiments, but instructing participants to attend the 
red card, did not show any facilitation of the cue on performance or reaction 
times. Providing visual context (Gayet et al., 2013) by intermixing visible and 
invisible trials did not elicit any effect either. 
 No effect of the subliminal cue was found even by running an exact replication 
of the original study (Soto et al., 2011, Experiment 1), on a larger sample. 
Replicating the same effect would have confirmed that subliminal stimuli can be 
held in WM, although only under specific experimental conditions to be better 
investigated and outlined, and which the experiments in the previous chapters 
did not adhere to. This was not the case: in the trials for which participants 
claimed to be unaware of the stimulus, performance was at chance level. 
Furthermore, in all the exact replications attempts, stimuli were not suppressed 
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from the awareness and participants were statistically able to discriminate the 
presence of the stimulus. 
The first replication described resembles all the parameters reported in the 
original paper as closely as possible. Some additional information was kindly 
provided by the authors of Soto et al. (2011), like the mask details and the 
participants mean score to calculate the priors for the Bayesian analyses. The 
following replications were designed in light of the observation that stimuli 
were not properly suppressed (Experiment 13) and used some clarifications 
provided after further enquiries to Soto and Silvanto (Soto, personal 
communication, December 2017) about the actual stimuli characteristics 
(Experiment 14). The authors clarified that their stimuli were gratings and not 
Gabor patches, that the spatial frequency was in a different unit, and they 
suggested trying a different mask, providing the code for the dot noise used in 
Experiment 15. 
None of these manipulations was effective in suppressing stimuli from 
awareness, and none of these experiments showed evidence of above chance 
performance in the "unconscious" trials. 
One possible concern is that, due to different monitors and apparatus, stimuli 
did not precisely match those used for the original published experiments, 
thereby failing to elicit the same effect. Also, it might be argued that it is not 
possible to consider these experiments as exact replications due to the difficulty 
of getting a proper suppression. This latter problem would have been worrying 
in case of significant results, to be reasonably attributed to a breakthrough 
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suppression. This was not the case, as performance remained at chance in the 
unseen trials. Moreover, in the conceptual replications suppression was 
properly achieved, but still no effect was found (71% and 79% of the cued trials 
receiving a rating of 1 in my two conceptual replications vs the 59% of cued 
trials receiving a rating of 1 in Soto et al. (2011, according to personal 
communication, December 2017). 
Acknowledging the difficulty of precisely recreating all the experimental 
parameters as in the original laboratory, I put all my efforts into replicating the 
study as closely as possible, to the point of sharing my experimental code and 
screenshots with Soto and Silvanto and asking them for suggestions.  
Hence, if this was not enough to replicate findings showing the retention of 
subliminal stimuli into WM, then any generalisation should be drawn very 
carefully because it means that the effect described by Soto et al. (2011) is only 
linked to very specific experimental conditions. 
Replicating or re-analysing the data of other above mentioned studies 
supporting Soto’s results (Bergstrom et al., 2015; King et al., 2016; Trübutschek 
et al., 2017;), would also be very beneficial to clarify the nature of such effect, 
especially to rule out the possibility that they are reflecting the phenomenon of 
regression to the mean described by Shanks (2016). 




5  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present work addressed the question of whether a stimulus of which one is 
not aware can be held in Working Memory in order to perform a task. Results 
from a considerable number of experiments led to a negative answer, not 
showing any support for such a possibility. 
WM is defined as the mental workspace where we keep information for a brief 
period of time in order to achieve a goal. Some authors define it as the place 
where thinking takes place (Baars & Franklin, 2003), and it is commonly 
associated with conscious experience (e.g. Baddeley, 2007), which means that 
we can report its content and the operation we perform on it. 
Recent advancements and findings in the study of non-conscious cognition lead 
to questioning this close relationship, based on the observation that high-level 
cognition is shown to take place without the need for consciousness (for a 
review see Hassin, 2013). If it is possible to extract the meaning of sentences or 
do arithmetic without being aware of it (Sklar et al., 2012), then it is possible 
that we can also maintain in WM information we are not aware of, especially 
considering that WM is involved in many high-level functions (Persuh, LaRock, 
& Berger, 2018).  
Previous studies have suggested that processing of subliminal stimuli can, in 
fact, be carried out within WM (Soto et al., 2011, Bergstrom et al., 2015; 
Trubushek et al.,2016; King et al., 2016). Soto et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
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participants were able to determine whether a Gabor patch was oriented 
clockwise or anti-clockwise with respect to a subliminal Gabor prime after a 
delay of 2 seconds. Hassin et al. (2009) demonstrated that WM can be engaged 
without explicit instructions, by finding that participants’ performance was 
facilitated in the perceptual judgment of dots appearing on the screen according 
to a specific pattern (e.g., a zigzag) rather than in a random order. Dots 
appeared on the screen one at time, so participants had to keep it in mind the 
previous dot’s location to recognise a pattern. Strikingly, participants claimed to 
be unaware of any pattern. According to Hassin et al. (2009), this means that 
participants were engaging in WM processes without being aware of it.  
These findings have prompted the proposal of new views of WM and its relation 
to consciousness. The most extreme proposal is the conscious copy model 
(Jacobs & Silvanto, 2015), according to which WM is never consciously 
experienced, but what we can access is a conscious representation of its actual 
content. 
If WM can be completely dissociated from consciousness- as it can retain stimuli 
which are not available to conscious awareness and can also be activated 
without conscious intention by visible stimuli - then it follows that WM should 
be unconsciously activated by subliminal stimuli that must be retained in order 




5.1    The present work 
 
In the current work I addressed the issue of whether, in order to perform a task, 
people can engage WM to retain a subliminal prime without being instructed to 
do so and without awareness of both the prime and WM activation. Participants 
were engaged in a guessing game in which they had to guess which of four 
playing cards was the winning card. The location of the winning card was 
subliminally primed before every selection, within a delay of 500, 1000, 2000 or 
5000ms.  
Differently from previous experiments on implicit WM activation, which used 
stimuli for which there were existing long-term memory representations 
(Hassin et al., 2009), in the present study no semantic processing was required, 
it was a simple but pure Visual WM task. This is particularly important 
considering that the conditions for implicit WM activation are still not clear, and 
I wanted to rule out the possibility that such activation is due to long-term 
memory retrieval bypassing WM. Della Sala et al. (2010), in fact, demonstrated 
unconscious processing of stimuli matching familiar but not unfamiliar 
proverbs, concluding that semantic retrieval does not require consciousness 
and WM. 
With the present paradigm, I also tried to address some criticisms raised about 
previous studies on WM without awareness. I controlled for the possibility of a 
conscious maintenance of a guess due to subliminal perception (Stein et al., 
2016) by using different delays. Such guess maintenance would have biased 
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performance similarly for all delays, and possibly even at the shortest delay of 
500ms.   
A further criticism I addressed concerns the way to assess for awareness of the 
stimuli. I collected both objective and subjective measures of prime awareness, 
using a perceptual experiment as a control after the main experiments. This 
allowed me to perform a stringent control for stimulus awareness.  
My exclusion criterion was not based on subjective awareness ratings, which is 
commonly considered to underestimate the actual stimulus perception (e.g. 
Eriksen, 1960). Rather, participants were excluded if performance on a 
subliminal perceptual task resembling the main experiment was above chance 
(Stein & Sterzer, 2014). Therefore, not only did I exclude participants for whom 
the prime may have broken through the suppression, but also those with a 
stronger ‘blindsight perception’ who were not necessarily aware of the stimulus 
(e.g. Hesselmann, 2013; Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014). 
Such a strict control makes me more confident that I was assessing genuinely 
unconscious processing. This is particularly relevant for the present paradigm, 
the nature of which does not allow me to assess subjective awareness after each 
trial.  
On the other hand, this method is susceptible to regression to the mean, as 
described by Shanks (2016), whereby selection of the data based on extreme 
scores in only one of the two measures, is likely to result in less extreme scores 
for the second measure. In other words, excluding participants on the basis of 
an extreme score (no awareness) on one task may bias the findings on the other 
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task’s scores. For this reason, I was cautious in interpreting any positive results 
and I ran Bayesian analyses along with the traditional analyses based on null 
hypothesis testing. This has been strongly recommended with this kind of task 
(Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014; Dienes, 2015; Vadillo et 
al., 2015; Sand & Nilsson, 2016), where testing for unawareness of the stimuli is 
based on the acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
5.1.1 Overview of findings 
A pilot Experiment, were the stimuli were not masked, confirmed that 
participants used the red card as a cue for their choice even if they were not 
instructed to do so. Further perceptual pilots Experiments were run to make 
sure that stimuli luminance was adequate to get a proper suppression under 
CFS. 
The first series of experiments employed CFS, a technique based on binocular 
rivalry, which allows the suppression of a stimulus from awareness by 
presenting it to one eye while the other eye is presented with a dynamic mask 
(Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). 
 Experiment 1 was inconclusive. However, its results presented me with the 
interesting question of whether a colour in the Mondrian mask could affect the 
colour processing of a suppressed stimulus. This indicates how important it is to 
pay considerable attention to the method chosen to suppress stimuli from 
awareness (e.g., Dubois and Faivre, 2014). 
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In the subsequent study (Experiment 2) I observed significantly above chance 
performance after the 2000ms delay. If this result were to replicate, it would 
indicate that participants were implicitly engaging their WM with subliminal 
stimuli after a consolidation period with subsequent decay of the memory trace.  
However, this finding did not replicate (Experiment 3) when using a prime of a 
different colour. In this experiment, a significantly above chance performance 
emerged for the 5000ms delay. To ascertain whether the difference between 
these two outcomes was due to the physical characteristics of the colours (red 
vs green) or to a statistical fluke, I performed a further experiment (Experiment 
4) by intermixing trials in which the target was a red card with trials in which 
the target was a green card, with respective masks that did not contain the 
prime’s colour. The outcome was at odds with the previous findings: no 
significant effect for the green card and a weak effect with the red card after 
500ms.  
In a further CFS study (Experiment 5) the green prime and the red prime were 
presented in blocks, in counterbalanced order, again with their respective 
Mondrian masks. This experiment showed a partial replication of the effect with 
the green prime (above chance performance after 5000ms delay), but chance 
performance at all delays with the red prime. 
Finally, I tried to replicate the effect found in experiment 2, by repeating 
precisely the same experiment. Once again, the previously found results did not 
replicate, with performance at chance at each delay. 
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The occasional finding of significantly above chance performance in some 
conditions of the above-mentioned experiments might make it tempting to 
claim that WM could be engaged without awareness. This finding was very 
inconsistent though, none of the specific findings replicated, and none were 
strongly supported by Bayesian analyses. The occasional significant results 
could be due to statistical flukes. Rabagliati et al. (2018), for instance, after a 
series of failed replication attempts and computational simulations, concluded 
that false positive results are easily encountered in CFS studies, due to skewed 
response distributions and post hoc data selection. These conclusions, however, 
are based on RTs analyses. 
It remains possible that the inconsistency of the results was due to 
methodological issues, like the nature of CFS. It has been recently noted how 
different suppression methods can differently affect stimulus processing 
(Dubois & Faivre, 2014; Peremen & Lamy, 2014), and that CFS in particular 
allows processing of fractionated representations of the stimuli, and only 
restricted to low-level features (Moors et al., 2017; Peremen & Lamy, 2014), 
differently from what was previously thought (e.g. Hassin, 2013; Sklar et al., 
2012; Yang et al., 2014). Also, the number of participants excluded by the 
control experiments was very high in each of my CFS studies, leading to 
potentially underpowered analyses. 
Because of the above issues, I performed a second series of experiments where I 
used Backward Masking instead of CFS to suppress stimuli from awareness.  
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Reproducing the same experiment, with the only difference being the masking 
method (experiment 7) confirmed the ineffectiveness of the subliminal prime, 
with performance at chance. 
One possible concern is that, as noted by various authors (Ansorge et al., 2010; 
Mealor & Dienes, 2013), top-down mechanisms like motivation and feedback on 
performance can affect the processing of subliminal stimuli. I assessed whether 
the lack of task relevance and motivation was affecting the results found so far 
by running a further experiment (Experiment 8), again using BM, where 
participants received feedback after each choice. Still, performance was not 
different from chance. 
Finally, I wanted to explore the possibility that implicit activation of WM may 
only be linked to semantic retrieval, as in the case of Hassin et al. (2009) and 
Della Sala et al. (2010). To test this hypothesis, I carried out another experiment 
(Experiment 9) where primes consisted of line-drawn everyday objects, and 
participants had to select targets from an array of coloured cards among which 
one was of the colour commonly associated with the primed object. Again, the 
prime did not affect the card choice.  
It has to be noted that the use of BM instead of CFS had an impact on the 
number of participants excluded on the basis of their objective performance in 
the control experiment. This number was much lower in the BM experiments 
than in the CFS experiments. Nonetheless, despite the increased power with BM, 
where fewer participants needed to be excluded from data analyses, the 
absence of effects was even more robust than in the previous CFS experiments.  
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Considering that none of the experiments yielded evidence for non-conscious 
WM activation, in the last series of experiments I went back to basics and 
performed conceptual and exact replications of published studies that have 
found such evidence. WM maintenance of subliminal stimuli has been reported 
by various labs, using different stimuli and techniques (e.g. Eriksson, Vogel, 
Lansner, Bergström, & Nyberg, 2015; King et al., 2016; Trübutschek et al., 2017), 
so I started by trying to replicate this effect with my stimuli. Finding above 
chance performance after instructing participants to retain the subliminal prime 
in memory, thus departing from one aspect of my newly-designed paradigm 
(with no explicit instruction to remember the prime) but conceptually 
replicating previous studies (which included such an instruction), could have 
been the basis to question the condition for implicit WM activation. This was not 
the case, as I still found no effect of the subliminal primes on participants’ 
performance, even when participants were instructed to attend the subliminal 
prime (Experiment 10), as in the published literature. I found no effect of 
subliminal primes on performance even when they were intermixed with visible 
primes (Experiment 11), to account for primes validity (Gayet et al., 2014; Reuss 
et al., 2011).  
At this point, I ran an exact replication of the pioneering study by Soto et al. 
(2011), specifically their Experiment 1. It could have been the case that 
subliminal WM retention is related to some particular categories of stimuli. Van 
Gaal et al. (2012) point out that some categories of stimuli, like the oriented 
gratings used by Soto et al., are apparently processed unconsciously without the 
need for any top-down modulation, differently from other kinds of stimuli. This 
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may be due to line-orientation processing occurring very early in the visual 
stream in primary visual areas (e.g. Haynes & Rees, 2005; Rajimehr, 2004). 
 Alternatively, as for other unconscious cognition studies (e.g. Rabagliati et al., 
2018), the effect may be less robust than thought and difficult to replicate by 
independent labs. As mentioned above, WM retention of subliminal stimuli has 
been demonstrated by different labs, but each of these studies uses different 
analyses and techniques, and are accompanied by different statistical concerns 
(Dubois & Faivre, 2014; Garaizar et al., 2014; Persuh et al., 2018; Marcus 
Rothkirch & Hesselmann, 2017; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & 
Cleeremans, 2010; Shanks, 2016; Vadillo, Konstantinidis, et al., 2015). 
Replicating the original experiment using pre-registered parameters and 
variables that are as close as possible to the original ones would thus make a 
paramount contribution.  
I made every possible effort in reproducing the same experiment, and I am 
grateful for the help provided by David Soto and Juha Silvanto, the original 
study’s authors. Nonetheless, the results were problematic: under the original 
display parameters, the prime was not consistently suppressed from awareness. 
Furthermore, performance in the trials where participants claimed to be 
unaware of the prime was at chance. Using a different, more effective, mask did 
not change the results. I continued corresponding with David Soto until 
reaching an agreement on the stimuli’s features, which turned out to be slightly 
different from the ones described in the paper (David Soto, December 2017, 
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personal communication), but another replication attempt still yielded null 
result.  
Four attempts at exact replication did not show any effect. It has to be noted 
that, as mentioned above regarding the first replication attempt, the level of 
stimulus suppression in all replication experiments was quite weak. Apart from 
different hardware (monitor and computer), I replicated all the experimental 
conditions as closely as possible to the original paper, also following instruction 
obtained from the authors (David Soto, December 2017, personal 
communication). The lack of suppression might render my attempt not 
definable as an exact replication (Juha Silvanto, November 2017, personal 
communication); however, if this is the case, it remains unclear which aspect of 
the original study led to better suppression and why such suppression would be 
associated with greater non-conscious WM. The difference itself is due to subtle 
differences, indicating that the effect is weaker than thought and probably 
dependent on extremely specific monitors or conditions. Furthermore, the level 
of suppression reached in the conceptual replication (Experiment 12) was high, 
but there was still no sign of maintenance of the suppressed stimuli.  
In summary, in a series of eleven originally-designed studies encompassing 
different techniques, stimuli and manipulations, I could not find any evidence of 
WM processing outside of consciousness. Four additional replication attempts 
also failed to demonstrate WM maintenance of subliminal stimuli, in line with 




5.2 Implications related to previous literature 
In line with the present results, Stein et al. (2018) in a work assessing 
unconscious WM presented in a conference talk, described evidence supporting 
a weakly conscious WM rather than unconscious WM, questioning the 
possibility of WM processing without awareness. 
My work adds on the increasing number of studies demonstrating that 
conclusions from unconscious cognition studies must be drawn very carefully 
(Persuh et al., 2018; Rabagliati et al., 2018; Shanks, 2016; Stein et al., 2016; 
Hesselmann & Moors, 2015; Vadillo, et al., 2015). 
Some authors (Lau, 2009; Persuh, Emmanouil, & Ro, 2016; Persuh et al., 2018), 
for example, have speculated that results from studies of unconscious cognition 
might be artefacts due to shortcomings of current masking methods. Different 
methodologies affect perception and processing in different ways (Marcus 
Rothkirch & Hesselmann, 2017) and their underlying mechanisms are still 
unclear and a matter of debate (Dubois and Faivre, 2014). This, along with 
differences in the awareness assessments and statistical concerns (Rotrichk and 
Hesselmann, 2017; Shanks, 2016; Vadillo et al., 2015; Garaizar et al., 2014), 
makes it very hard to draw convincing conclusions from unconscious cognition 
studies, especially considering the difficulty in replicating their results 
(Rabagliati et al., 2018; Shanks, 2016; Moors et al., 2017).  
There is currently great enthusiasm about the possibility of studying the 
conscious and the unconscious mind through new paradigms and techniques. 
However, it seems premature to declare overreaching rules like the Yes It Can 
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principle (Hassin, 2013) or to reappraise existing theories of WM, especially in 
favour of claiming WM is utterly non-conscious (Jacobs & Silvanto 2015). 
In their commentary on the paper by Hesselmann & Moors (2015), which 
pointed out some criticism of the YIC principle (Hassin, 2013), Goldstein & 
Hassin (2017) wonder why scientists and other people have the strong intuition 
that there are cognitive functions that cannot be carried out outside of 
conscious awareness. They reply to this question following  Dan Gilbert (2006), 
with the idea that humans need to distinguish themselves from all the other 
beings, and this is why they value their consciousness so much. As with many 
questions, though, reversing it leads to the complementary strong intuition: 
following the question by Goldstein and Hassin, I wonder why researchers and 
other people have the strong intuition that we are not aware of many of the 
things we do, perceive and know?  
If it might be true that human beings congratulate themselves for having 
something considered as unique as consciousness, and believe it as the reason 
they can perform functions that other beings cannot; it is also true that 
consciousness brings a big moral responsibility (Levy, 2014). The idea that what 
makes us human is the extent of our unconscious abilities (Goldstein & Hassin, 
2017; Hassin, 2013; Neisser, 1963) can reassure us not only about the 
limitations of consciousness (Baddeley, 2007) but perhaps also about the 
responsibility that comes with it. 
 Philosophical speculation is outside of the scope of the present work, but it is 
worth mentioning this point because contrary to the observation of Goldstein 
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and Hassin (2017), strong intuitions exist on both sides of the debate about 
unconscious cognition, which is a particularly controversial topic. The present 
work, in fact, started with the idea that non-conscious WM might exist, but 
results from a substantial number of experiments did not show any empirical 
evidence to support this possibility.  
On the other hand, this does not mean that consciousness is definitely necessary 
for WM, or that WM processing cannot take place outside of it, but it does show 
that the jury is still out - more evidence is required. Future work should address 
the possibility of a graded relationship between WM function and consciousness 
(Logie, 2016), employing strict control criteria and analyses and possibly 
relying not only on laboratory masking methods but also on neuropsychological 
and clinical evidence (Persuh et al., 2018). 
In conclusion, the present work does not provide support to the hypothesis of 
the existence of non-conscious WM and raises doubts about the replicability of 








6 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 
a) Proportion of cue-congruent answers sorted by delay and including all 
the participants for each of the nine experiments involving a control task. 
The overall consistency of these results with the ones obtained after 
participants’ exclusion is important to rule out the effect of regression to 
the mean (see section 1.1.1), following the application of post-hoc data 




























































































b) Overall analysis of experiments 1-11, with pooled data. Participants or 
trials were excluded according to the criteria described in each 
experiment. The similarity between the experiments makes this analysis 
a meaningful way to address the low statistical power of each single 
experiment after participants’ exclusion.  
For each delay the proportion of cue congruent answers was not 
different from chance, represented by the red dotted line. This finding 
strongly supports the conclusion that the few above-chance results were 
false positives and that there was no unconscious WM process involved. 
Bars are SEM. 
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